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ROBERT L. SWARTWOUT*

Current Utility Regulatory
Practice from a Historical
Perspective
THUCYDIDES (460?-400? B.c., philosopher, historian) said in the introduction to his History of the Peloponnesian Wars:
I shall be content if those shall pronounce my history useful who
desire to give a view of events as they really did happen, and as
they are very likely, in accordance with human nature, to repeat
themselves at some future time-if not exactly the same, yet very
similar.
ABSTRACT
This paper was written to show as concisely as possible the history
of the development of regulation by government of utilities in this
country. How that history provides a picture of how our system of
utility regulation is supposed to work, how some current regulatory
and other trends affecting utilities related to that history and to the
public interest, and how and why caution is advisable in the move-

ment to change how we treat utilities within ourfree market economic
system if we are to assure reasonableand adequateprotection of the
public interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric gas and water utilities that are the subject of this paper
compose a special category of business in the United States. Utility
services have been and still are a necessity for the grand majority of their
customers. It has been said that the nature of the business of utilities is
such that, if that business for whatever reason did not exist, it would
have to be created by government to satisfy the needs and convenience
of the people. As a result of their close relationship to the public interest,
utilities are granted certain fights by our various levels of government
and have special obligations associated with those rights. That set of
rights and obligations makes up what has become known as the regulatory
*Mr. Swartwout is a registered engineer in New Mexico and New York. He has nearly 30 years
experience in the utility industry including both government regulation of utilities and work directly
for the industry. Mr. Swartwout is currently serving as president of a small investor owned utility
in New Mexico.
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compact. The regulatory compact is the keystone of the structure that
supports our unique system of regulation by government of investor owned
public utilities. Utilities in most other industrialized countries are either
nationalized or are otherwise directly controlled by government.'
Investor owned public utilities have operated under essentially the same
form of government regulation for nearly a century in this country and,
under that system, the utilities and the economy for which they are a
significant element of support has, for the most part, thrived nicely to
the benefit of all. Beginning in the late 1960s, however, many factors
began to adversely affect utilities and our economy as a whole. Those
factors included things such as the energy crisis, rampant inflation, tighter
capital markets, greater environmental controls, et cetera. The electric
utilities experienced higher fuel costs, rapidly increasing construction
costs, declining growth rates and excess capacity. 2
The utilities and their regulators have been struggling with an onslaught
of rapidly occurring changes that, in general, have combined to cause
rapidly increasing customer rates for utility services. As a result, there
has been a spate of searching for who should be blamed for the unsurprisingly unpopular escalating costs for utility services. The popular wisdom has centered that blame on the regulatory process, with some
justification. The regulators were asked to respond quickly to major problems for which they were frequently ill-prepared by their recent experience
and which also usually resulted in at least the potential for very unpopular
rate increase decisions.
Whereas the reformers who designed our utility regulatory process 100
years or so ago intended it to be apolitical, it is certainly no longer so
(if it ever really was so to any great extent). Further, the public profile
of the regulators has been greatly increased in recent years thereby exacerbating the political and the pressure cooker aspects of their jobs. One
result has been a very rapid increase in the rate of turnover of regulatory
commissioners and staff. That turnover has had the effect of decreasing
the continuity of decisionmaking and reducing the dampening effect of
institutional memory thereby providing a condition conducive to less than
ideal, impartial decisionmaking.
The frequency of utility requests for rate hikes increased at a fantastic
rate and they kept coming in waves during the 1970s and early 1980s.
The complexity of rate case issues, the number of issues, and their dollar
I. C. Phillips, Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities 5, 6 (1984); A. Kahn, The Economics of
Regulation 2 (1970); D. Jones, Regulation and the TraditionalSocial Contract, II NRRI Q. Bull.
(Sept. 1990).
2. Competition in Electricity: New Markets and New Structures 441 (J.Plummer & S. Troppman
eds.. 1990) [hereinafter Competition in Electricityl.
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impact also increased by orders of magnitude. The cases before the commissions were also accompanied by an increase in intervention by many
new parties to the proceedings coming from an aroused consumer movement represented both by private consumer organizations, government
agencies, and business and industrial customers and organizations. As a
result, it is generally reasonable to claim that the regulatory process did
not perform as well as it should have during what have been very troubled
times.
In the past few years, purportedly as a result of dissatisfaction with
the effectiveness of regulation, there has been a rediscovery of the concept
of competition in the context of utilities. It has become popular wisdom
that we can solve most if not all of the perceived ills of the utility industry
by the simple act of deregulating the industry and thereby causing the
operation of self-regulating competition.' The notion that Adam Smith's
"invisible hand" of self-regulating competition4 in and among the providers of utility services precludes the need for government regulation is
not a new idea in the United States. It has been tried before, in fact, as
early as over a century ago. Competition in the utility sector, however,
has failed to perform as expected by its proponents every time it has been
tried so far.5 Being a practical folk, we found our own better way with
a compromise that combined the concepts of free enterprise to the extent
practicable for our utilities with regulation by government. That better
way is the unique utility regulatory system that we now seem to be rushing
to scrap as soon as we can. 6
It is not necessarily reasonable to assume that things are so different
now from when previous attempts at reliance on competition to selfregulate utilities failed and that the disappointments of the past won't
recur. Further, it was to a great extent those failures that brought about
the reform that is our current regulatory system. People and their usually
unpredictable "human nature" are unavoidably linked with the economics
of anything and everything, and people have not changed all that much.'
It is that same human nature that creates the degree of want for, and
therefore the perceived scarcity of, technological commodities such as
electric and gas utility service.' If economic theory can be expected to
3. The commentary in the last few paragraphs is based on my personal experience including
nearly 16 years in the government regulation of utilities (beginning in 1963) and 10 years as an
independent consultant in the utilities field.
4. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).
5. D. Jones, Regulatory Concepts, Propositions, and Doctrines: Casualties and Survivors, 22 J.
Econ. Issues (Dec. 1988).
6. The history and occurrences supporting these statements will be fully developed herein.
7. W. Hudson, Business Without Economists 69, 70 (1987).
8. R. Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society (1962).
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model history before it can be asked to predict the future, then it is
reasonable to expect that its practitioners first view any intended application of economic theory to public policy in the full light of history.
It is also important to recognize that the technological and economic
sphere of influence in which utilities now operate has increased by orders
of magnitude over the last few decades., The manufactured gas plant
corporations which began operation in the early 1800s and continued
through the expansion of natural gas service following World War I1
generally served one community or just a part of one community. The
same applied to the early electric utilities. In more recent times, however,
the utility sphere of influence has been dramatically increased as a result
of the development of long transmission lines for natural gas and transmission grids for electricity.
In other words, whereas things today may appear different from what
they were in the "old days," they are really not so different. They are
just larger now, representing an even greater potential hazard and the fall
will be that much harder if the pattern that history has shown us should
repeat itself as regards the economic performance of utilities under competition.
Our utility industry is both a large and a critical component of our
national economy and has become an absolutely necessary element of
the way we all live, and expect to live. Our electric utilities require more
capital than does any other single industry. In fact, over the two years
ending in 1987, electric utility investment in plant and equipment exceeded the total invested by the combination of all of our airline, railroad,
mining, aerospace and steel industries. The current total (original cost)
invested by our electric utility industry is in the neighborhood of 300
billion dollars ($300,000,000,000.00).' It goes without saying that we
could not run either our households or our businesses and industries
without adequate, reliable and reasonably priced utility services. There
is no question that utilities are still clothed with the public interest which
is and always has been the principal justification for regulation and the
true foundation for the regulatory compact.
It must be asked whether it is a good idea to tear down the nature of
the utility industry in order to save it from what may be transient problems.
It is also reasonable to be concerned that if the current reform movement
should destroy or adversely affect the utility industry as we now know
it, the subsequent (re-)reform after failure of the proposed reforms may
not be re-regulation butcould rather be municipalization or nationalization

9, Competition in Electricity, supra note 2, at 333.

Spring 19921

CURRENT UTILITY REGULATION

of our utilities. Based on observation of the rest of the industrialized
world, the latter potential outcome is not necessarily good. 0
The United Kingdom (UK) nationalized many of its industries, including utilities, after World War II.
The intent was to deal with those
industries where it was felt that, for reasons such as economies of scale,
monopoly was inevitable. It was also assumed that public ownership
would better provide assurance of the protection of the public interest
than could private ownership. However, the desired result was not achieved
and the Thatcher administration began actively pursuing a policy of privatization of industry in the UK, which policy is still on-going. France
has also been privatizing its industries in recent years."
Privatization as it is being applied to utilities in the UK, however, is
not a clean break from all government regulation or intervention, even
though that concept has been a large part of the rhetoric supporting the
British privatization movement. So-called stopgap regulation was put in
place in the privatized telecommunications industry, purportedly to protect
domestic and small business customers until effective competition is developed. Regulation for water service is considered permanent because
it is recognized that it will remain monopolistic. In natural gas regulation
is intended to be permanent for all customers other than large commercial
and industrial customers who negotiate special contracts for their service. 2
The regulation that is being imposed on privatized utilities in the UK
is claimed to be market surrogation "to achieve the same 'market place'
goals of allocative and productive efficiency-in other words to keep
costs and prices low and service and quality high."' 3 The basic structure
and procedure of the new utility regulation applications in the UK are
based primarily on the United States regulatory model which is the subject
of this paper. There is, then, even in this recent and ongoing reform
movement, recognition that the market place is not an entirely adequate
protection for the public interest of most utility customers."
We as a nation cannot afford to charge into a new way of dealing with
our utilities without greater assurance than that provided by economic or
any other theory. If we choose to experiment with the reapplication of
economic theory to our utilities we must do so cautiously and with a preplanned path for retreat. It has not been demonstrated that our long10. Salvaging Public Utility Regulation I (W. Sichel ed., 1976); Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation 158 (L. Hancher & M. Moran eds., 1989) [hereinafter Capitalism].
i1.Capitalism, supra note 10, at 142-44.
12. id.
13. id. at 142-43.
14. Id. at 142-44.
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standing utility regulatory process cannot work--only that during some
very difficult times it did not work very well. Regulatory performance
during the past few years may have been only a transitory and reversible
phenomenon. It has not been shown that the regulators cannot improve
their performance and act more impartially and more wisely. 5
Both regulation and deregulation of utilities are discretionary acts, and
whatever we do must be founded on the protection of the public interest.
Economic theory does not and cannot tell us precisely just how much
competition is the right amount. One reason is that real world businesses
and markets seldom if ever precisely fit classical economic models. 6
Another is that government intervention itself has and will continue to
alter the operation of economic market mechanisms. 7
The basic question, then, is whether undoubtedly imperfect and at least
historically destructive competition among utilities is preferable to imperfect regulation. Competition among utilities or components of utilities
neither will nor can be realistically expected to conform to the classic
competitive model of the social science of economics. The atomistic
competition originally conceived by Adam Smith and carried forward
into modern economic theory does not exist for our capital intensive
utilities, especially considering the depth of the public interest which is
inextricably entwined with our public utilities.
But that certainly does not and cannot speak against maximizing the
traditional free enterprise nature of our economy whenever and wherever
it can practically be expected to work reasonably well with assurance
that the public interest will be served. Our utility regulatory system is a
hybrid based on experience that recognizes the fact that utilities are affected with the public interest while keeping utilities within the private
sector of business, albeit in modified form from businesses that can better
function under classical economic models.
Further, even after deregulation, it is generally recognized that government will not be able to just sit back and let competition take its
course. Continual government intervention will be required if workable
utility markets are to exist indefinitely. In other words, even to the extent
that utility industries, or portions of industries, are deregulated, some
government economic regulation in some form will still be required. This
should not be surprising because, even in the laissez faire concept of the
classical model of competition, it is recognized that guidelines must be
set by government. " In order to understand our utility regulatory system
15. D. Jones, What's Right with Utility Regulation, Pub. Utils. Fort. (Mar. 1986).
16. S. Miller, The Economics of Nuclear and Coal Power 107 (1976).
17. G. Bach, Economics-An Introduction to Analysis and Policy 498 (1960); Capitalism, supra
note 10, at 139.
18. Bach, supra note 17, at 489 (1960); R. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers 52-53 (1953);
Capitalism, supra note 10, at 139.
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this paper will trace the history of its development in order to show how
the system is supposed to work and why it is supposed to work that way.
Further, in order to understand the potential implications of recent and
proposed regulatory and de-regulatory actions this paper will to relate
them to how the regulatory process was designed to work and why it was
so designed.
II. THE HISTORY OF UTILITY REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Beginnings and Sources
The theory and structure of the utility regulatory system that grew in
the United States had its beginnings long before the United States even
existed. Governments had involved themselves with the regulation of
private businesses long before North America was even colonized. 9
The Romans had developed in their law the theory of a "natural price;"
that being the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.
Controversy then developed over the Roman doctrine and St. Augustine
and the Roman Catholic Church expressed the opinion that a more correct
doctrine was that of a "just price." A just price was defined as where
the seller only added just so much to his price to be enough to provide
for his customary economic support but so as to not provide for his "unjust
enrichment." 2' Thomas Aquinas wrote that "it is wholly sinful to practice
fraud for the express purpose of selling a thing for more than its just
price, inasmuch. as a man deceives his neighbor to his loss." 2' Another
concept behind the just price doctrine was the general suspicion of the
motives of business and enterprise as well as the desire to avoid price
abuses that might occur under special circumstances of coercion that could
exist to the benefit of the seller.22
Western European countries also began the practice of chartering or
franchising business monopolies as much as 200 years before the United
States came into existence. As early as the sixteenth century France
granted royal charters of monopoly to plantations and to trading companies and later England established the well known Hudson Bay and
East India Trading Companies.23 Those royal charters were the predecessors to the modern certificate of public convenience and necessity
(CCN)24 and the reasons for their granting are somewhat parallel because
they are both intended to be an incentive for investment and for the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Phillips, supra note 1; M. Glaeser, Public Utilities in American Capitalism 196 (1957).
Glaeser, supra note 19, at 196.
Heilbroner, supra note 8, at 39.
Glaeser, supra note 19, at 196.
Phillips, supra note 1.
The origins and purpose of the modem CCN will be explained in detail later in this paper.
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assumption of risks as a result of the protection from competition by
government. 5
Much of the legal system in the United States has its origins in the
English system of common law.26 As a direct example, in the 1600s Lord
Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale of England wrote a treatise entitled "De
Portibus Mars" in which he stated:
A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town,
set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and his customers
can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no
more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most of his
own .... If the King or subject have a public wharf, unto which
all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their
goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed
by the king ... or because there is no other wharf in that port, as
it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot
be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, et cetera, neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate;
but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled by
the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and crane and other
conveniences are affected with a public interest and they cease to be
juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his
own land, it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected
by a public interest."'
Lord Hale's treatise was quoted by the United States Supreme Court
in Munn v. Illinois (1877).2" This landmark decision is reputed to be a
root source of the regulation of utilities in the United States.29 The English
Parliament in Lord Hale's time began to regulate certain businesses as
"common callings" because they were deemed to be affected with the
public interest. Those occupations included wharfingers, bakers, brewers,
cab drivers, ferrymen, innkeepers, millers, smiths, surgeons and nailors.30
The British colonies in North America and the United States in its
early years attempted to apply the same regulation of private businesses. 3 '
The United States, however, began in the early 1800s to pursue a more
laissez faire approach in relations between government and business and
much of such government regulation was either dropped or'ignored. But
even then, laissez faire did not mean that government should do nothing25. Glaeser, supra note 19, at 201; Phillips, supra

note

I, at 76.

26. Phillips, supra note 1, at 76.
27. Phillips, supra note 1, at 76.
28. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 591 (1877).
29. R. Hofstadter & B. Hofstadter, Great Issues in American History 129 (1982).
30. Phillips, supra note 1, at 77; L. Hyman, America's Electric Utilities, Past, Present and Future
125 (1985).
31. Phillips. supra note I, at 77-78.
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it was understood that while government should minimize its interference
with private business enterprise, government still had an obligation to
provide a structural framework of basic guidelines within which business
must operate for the protection of the general public interest.:
Shortly after the Civil War, however, the reliance on the protection
afforded by the then relatively new economic theory of competition broke
down, particularly with respect to the railroads. Adam Smith's seminal
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, which is
the foundation for the economic theory of competition, was not published
until 1776, the same year we declared our independence. Competition
as envisioned by Smith was relied on by various levels of our government
to protect the public interest having to do with virtually all businesses in
the beginning of our industrial expansion. Railroads were among those
businesses, but railroads were found not to compete as expected under
Smith's theories.33 Significant abuses occurred, the competition turned
destructive, cartelization ensued, and de facto monopoly was the *outcome. 34 At that time, the Grangers and others began to accelerate movement down the path toward our utility regulatory system.35
Three methods of government regulation of investor owned utilities
were used during the 1800s which also led us down the path to the
commission system we know today. Although the timing varied somewhat
across the country, there was a natural progression that occurred in the
movement from judicial, to legislative, to local government or municipal
regulation and, finally, to state commission regulation of utilities in the
early twentieth century.
B. Judicial Regulation
The first step down the path, judicial regulation, was based on two
surviving common law principles: (1) that uncontrolled monopolies were
contrary to the public
interest, and (2) that certain occupations were
"6common callings.' 36 Judicial regulation could only begin with the litigation that occurs when a party claims to be wronged. As a result, the
only type of action available to the courts was negative and it was not
possible to set rates for the future because to do so would usurp a function
appropriate for the legislatures. Further, the courts could not be responsive
in a timely manner to changed economic conditions nor did the courts
have any particular expertise in the business and economic situations that
came before them.37
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Bach, supra note 17, at498.
E. Troxel, Economics of Public Utilities 5 (1947).
Id.;
Bach, supra note 17, at 489.
Hofstader, supra note 29, at 123-24.
Phillips, supra note 1,at 77-78.
Id.at 110-14.
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Judicial regulation was for these reasons passed over for legislative,
then municipal, and then ultimately, for commission regulation. It should
be noted, however, that commission decisions are still reviewable by the
courts when differences arise.
C. Legislative Regulation
The next step was regulation by the state legislatures. Some states
granted monopoly charters or franchises (pre-cursor CCNs) by enactment
of a law, and some of the grants placed limits on customer rates for
service, on the yield on common stock, declared service standards, and
established organizational and administrative requirements. In fact, many
of the early utility enterprises were directly incorporated by the state
legislatures 3.39
The legislative process, however, proved to be inflexible, impractical,
untimely and burdensome on the legislatures.' Rate limits and other
elements or conditions of the grants (laws) could not be changed without
new legislation or amendment. It was found to be impossible for the state
legislatures to react quickly enough to altered economic and business
circumstances." And, also as was found to be a problem with regulation
by the courts, the legislatures found that they did not have the specialized
knowledge or experience to deal effectively with the difficult and complex
economic and business issues of the utilities. 2
It is for these sound reasons that the state legislatures ultimately chose
to pass on some of their functions to what were originally created to be
nonpolitical, expert and impartial commissions for the regulation of utilities. However, this generally did not occur before local governments and
municipalities had already attempted to perform that difficult and controversial function.
D. Municipal or Local Government Regulation
The last step before commission regulation was municipal or local
government regulation of investor owned utilities. This was, if not the
least effective, certainly the messiest step of all. There are documented
cases of all sorts of political abuses including preferential and discrimi38. Bound volume prepared by counsel for Consolidated Gas Company of New York, Franchises
of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Affiliated Companies (Mar. 24, 1936)
(unpublished, on file with Mr. Frank Leonard, Esq. of Consolidated Edison Company; Consolidated
Gas Company was predecessor to Consolidated Edison Company) [hereinafter Franchises of Consolidated Edison].
39. Phillips, supra note 1, at 110-14.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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natory treatment of both utilities and their customers, cream skimming,
by-pass, and all nature of ill-considered actions at the municipal level.
Municipal franchises were even bought by speculators to be sold to the
highest bidder and multiple franchises were handed out with the intent
that competition would be self-regulating and would, therefore, protect
against all potential problems that might arise (it didn't)."3 There were a
few attempts at straightforward and practical regulation to establish provision for monopoly entry control, rate setting, service standards and
accounting rules. On the whole, the municipal regulation era was a disaster for all concerned. '
The municipal governments were also counting on competition to protect the interest of the public, and this era was probably the nearest we
have ever come to full and free competition among utilities. Even though
multiple franchises were handed out, and duplicative utility systems came
into being, the nature of the competition was ruinous and short lived.45
There were 45 mostly overlapping franchises granted for electric utility
operation in Chicago between 1882 and 1905. By 1905, however, the
monopoly entity of Chicago Edison and the merged Commonwealth Edison had risen from the chaos.'
New York City granted six overlapping franchises to electric utilities
in 1887, but again, by 1907 the Consolidated Gas Company of New York
(owned in great part by the Standard Oil interests) dominated the gas and
electric utility business in that city. Today's Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Ed) was first formed under that name from
the Consolidated Gas Company of New York on March 24, 1936. At
that time, Consolidated Gas Company was made up of 17 affiliated companies and the predecessors to those companies included 92 companies.
There had been a total of 140 franchises granted to those companies, five
having been granted by the state legislature and 135 by municipalities.
The first gas franchise was a legislative incorporation and granted to the
New York Gas Light Company on March 26, 1823. The first electric
franchise was granted by New York City to Thomas A. Edison's Edison
Electric Illuminating Company of New York on April 19, 1881. The last
of the Con Ed municipal grants (as of 1936) was to the Peekskill Lighting
and Railroad Company on March 24, 1906, almost a year before the
State of New York passed its Public Utility Act, which included CCN
authority, on March 6, 1907. 47
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Troxel, supra note 33, at 49 (1947).
Electric Power; Deregulation and the Public Interest 292 (J. Moorhouse ed., 1986).
B. Behling, Competition and Monopoly in Public Utility Industries 23, 54 (1938).
Electric Power, supra note 44, at 292.
Franchises of Consolidated Edison, supra note 38.
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Along with the political abuses of the era, the competition between
the utilities that was supposed to protect the public interest turned cutthroat; abuses included price discrimination, price undercutting and price
fixing. Cartelization and combination resulted and the utility type monopoly emerged anyway. Customer rates wound up higher than ever. To
a great extent, it was the era of municipal regulation that precipitated the
need for the public utility regulatory reforms that occurred in the late
1800s and early 1900s."'
Finally, as with the first two steps down the path, municipal regulation
was untimely, unresponsive, and local government and municipal officials
had no more specifically applicable expertise than did the judges or the
legislators.
While the problems of judicial, legislative and municipal regulation
were being played out, certain actions of the United States Supreme Court
established further groundwork along the route to commission regulation.
The court in Munn v. Illinois (1877)" 9 paved the way for regulation of
utilities and other businesses in the United States.5" Munn operated a
grain elevator in Chicago which the Court found to be monopolistic and
clothed with the public interest, and, as a result, government regulation
was therefore found to be acceptable. The Smyth v. Ames decision of.
the United States Supreme Court in 1898 clearly stated that the path to
commission type regulation was the best way to go.' The decision stated
that the determination of proper compensation with due process ". . . could
be more easily determined by a Commission composed of persons whose
special skill, operation and experience qualifies them to handle so great
problems .. .""
E. Development of the State Commissions
The first state regulatory commission was established in Rhode Island
in 1839. There were a total of 25 state commissions in place by 1887,
but their authority was very limited and mostly related to railroads. New
York did create the Office of the Inspector of Gas Meters in 1859 and
extended the jurisdiction of that office to electric meters in 1861. In 1885
Massachusetts enacted legislation establishing a Board of Gas Commissioners having authority over rates and entry of new companies into gas
utility markets and in 1887 the Board's power was extended to include
electric utilities. The first state utility regulatory commissions with full
48. Behling, supra note 45, at 54.
49. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 591 (1877).
50. Hofstader, supra note 29, at 123-24.
51. A. Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation 26 (1969); F. Welch, Cases and Text on
Public Utility Regulation 395 (1968).
52. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
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regulatory authority were created in 1907 in New York and Wisconsin."
Charles Evans Hughes spearheaded commission development in New
York. Hughes, then known as a "trust buster" attorney, was appointed
counsel to a legislative committee in 1905 to investigate gas and electric
utility abuses. The nature of the abuses were those associated with the
era of municipal regulation. That committee recommended the creation
of a commission to be appointed by the governor with the advice and
consent of the senate with authority over the quality of utility service,
CCNs, rates, financing, accounting methods, reporting, and utility books
and records. The commission's actions were to be structured so as to be
subject to suitable review by the courts upon appeal.54
Mr. Hughes was elected Governor of New York in 1906, primarily on
the issue of utility regulation. He was opposed in that race by William
Randolph Hearst whose campaign was based on municipal or government
ownership of utilities. Governor Hughes signed the bill creating the Public
Service Commission in New York on March 6, 1907. There was a parallel
development in Wisconsin led by Governor Robert La Follette. The essentially similar Wisconsin law creating their Public Service Commission
was signed into law about two months later than New York. California
followed in 1911. It became clear that one reason for the pioneer development of our system of utility regulation was to keep our utilities in the
private business sector.55
Between 1907 and 1914 27 states created public utility regulatory
commissions. Nearly every state had established utility commissions by
1920.56 The last states to establish commissions were Alaska (1960),
Iowa (1963), Minnesota (1975), South Dakota (1976) and Texas (1976)5."
Nebraska does not have a commission because all of its utilities are
publicly owned. The state laws generally follow the models of the New
York, Wisconsin and California laws with Wisconsin being most used.5"
It is interesting to examine the manner in which the reformers perceived
the need for, and designed controls into, the commission system. The
universally essential elements were maximizing the independence, impartiality and nonpolitical nature of the commissions. The following is a
summary of those controls as originally designed:
53. W. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, Developments in
the States, 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 447 (1979).
54. Report prepared by the staff of the New York Public Service Commission, The Politics of
Regulation-A History of the Public Service Commission 19 (1982) (unpublished, on file with Mr.
Robert Swartout, Santa Fe, N.M.) [hereinafter The Politics of Regulation].
55. Id. at 21, 22, 43, 44, 53, 54, 68; Priest, supra note 51, at 27.
56. Priest, supra note 51, at 28, 31.
57. Competition in Electricity, supra note 2, at 25.
58. Priest, supra note 51, at 28.
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I. An uneven number of commissioners were to be appointed by
the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Commissioners were intended to be persons having specifically useful knowledge and experience, and the commissions were given the ability to
employ staff with specialized training and expertise.
2. In some states there could be no more than a simple majority
of commissioners from any one political party.
3. Commissioners could only be removed from office for malfeasance, incompetence, neglect of duty or upon proof of other improper actions. It was believed by the reformers that a Commissioner
could not act independently if his position was dependent on the
opinion or whim of a governor or anyone else. The United States
Supreme Court in 1935 expressed this concern stating that ". . . it
is quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure
of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will." 5 9
4. Commissioners were appointed and not elected because it was
felt that, should a campaign for election be run on an issue such as
consumerism or on a pro-utility platform, a commissioner could not
be fairly expected to be impartial.
5. The terms of the commissioners were designed to be longer
than the terms of elected officials, and the commissioner's terms
were to be staggered in time so as to cause the term of a sitting
commission to be longer than the term of a single political administration. The purpose was to foster independence of and minimize
politicization of the commissions.
6. The commission's decisionmaking functions were designed to
be quasi-judicial in nature operating under rules of civil procedure
parallel to those of the courts in order to avoid improper influence
on the commissioners and to assure that all parties would have equal
rights in the process.6'
Utility regulation has attracted controversy since its beginning. An
early disagreement was over the quasi-judicial aspect of public utility
regulation. A major continuing public argument on that subject occurred
in 1930 between then New York Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and William A. Prendergast who was the Chairman of the Public Service
Commission at the time. FDR felt that commissions could not be "merely
a court" but that they should be "rather intended to represent [only] the
public interests."62
59. Humphreys Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 609 (1935).
60. These six criteria are my interpretation of material obtained from a large number of sources
that I have read and reviewed over the past 25 years.
61. The Politics of Regulation, supra note 54, at 43-44.
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It appears to me, however, that the matter had already been put in
perspective some 16 years before in 1914 by Milo R. Maltbie, who FDR
later appointed to the chairmanship of the commission after Prendergast
resigned. Mr. Maltbie wrote that:
It is apparent that some of these [commission] functions are legislative, others quasi-judicial and others administrative. If the [New
York] Commission were to abandon its quasi-judicial function, and
become the fearless champion of the people against the utilities, that
would not end the matter. Controversies now generally composed
by the Commission would simply be shifted to the courts .... Who
can tell how many cases would be appealed, and how much litigation
would ensue, if the Commission were to attempt to act merely as a
public prosecutor.62
Mr. Maltbie's comments are, in my opinion, still applicable today.
A standard part of the original and the current public utility laws is
the expression that the regulators have the obligation and duty to protect
three interests in the pursuit of their duties. Those interests are: (1) the
interests of utility customers, (2) the interests of the investors in the
utility, and (3) the interest of the general public. The New Mexico statute
is fairly typical, stating the following:
It is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the
interest of consumers and the interest of investors require the regulation and supervision of such public utilities to the end that reasonable and proper services shall be available at fair, just and reasonable
rates, and to the end that capital and investment may be encouraged
and attracted so as to provide for the construction, development and
extension, without unnecessary duplication and economic waste, of
proper plants and facilities for the rendition of service to the general
public and to industry.63
The New Mexico law is one of the later among the states having been
passed in 1941.
Once a commission has granted a CCN establishing a monopolistic
service territory for a utility, the underlying structure of the intended
commission process is the replication of or surrogation for the absent
competitive market for the utility's commodity so made available to
customers within their certified territory.'
Utilities obtained services, labor, materials, equipment, supplies, money
and other commodities in the same markets as did all other businesses.
62. Id. at 53-54.

63. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-3-1(B) (1978).
64. Electric Power, supra note 4, at 46, 240; A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation 20 (1970).
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The commissions, therefore, were found to have no need to substitute
for such existing markets but only in the monopolistic market in which
the sale to their customers of the particular utility commodity occurs.
The reformers determined, however, that Commissions must have the
obligation to assure that the utilities act prudently in those other markets
so as to avoid utility customer rates reflecting the costs of imprudent
management.
Unregulated markets send signals to the enterprises within such markets
indirectly by way of decreased sales or even by the ultimate failure of
one or more enterprises. The intended device by which the commissions
provide market type signals to the utilities they regulate operates through
regulatory disallowance of imprudent expenses and costs as well as by
means of the end result of and opinions expressed in their final rate and
other official orders issued. 65 In this manner, the government regulation
of utilities operates as a substitute or surrogate for an unregulated free
market.
The newest public utility act, which was enacted in Texas in 1976,
states its purpose as follows:
This Act is enacted to protect the public interest inherent in the
rates and services of public utilities. The Legislature finds that public
utilities are by definition monopolies in the area they serve; that
therefore the normal forces of competition which operate to regulate
prices in a free enterprise society do not operate; and that therefore
utility rates, operations and services are regulated by public agencies,
with the objective that such regulation shall operate as a substitute
for such competition. The purpose of this Act is to establish a comprehensive regulatory system which is adequate to the task of regulating public utilities as defined by this Act, to assure rates, operations,
and services which are just and reasonable to the consumers and to
the utilities.'
Surrogation for the competitive market is the guiding principle for the
rate regulation component of the utility regulatory process. But, as with
everything else in the process, it is not a purely mechanistic concept.
How can it be when the market place for which it surrogates is characterized by uncertainty and is therefore neither purely mechanical nor
predictable? Also, the system of utility regulation is not a system based
solely on quasi-scientific principles. It necessarily includes, and must
allow for, discretionary considerations associated with the rights and
obligations contained and implied in the process. However, the market
65. Kahn, supra note 64.
66. Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act; Article 1, Legislative Policy; sec. 2

Spring 19921

CURRENT UTILITY REGULATION

surrogation principle must always be considered in full and must be used
to police the function of utility rate regulation. 67
In addition, albeit generally provided somewhat later along the path,
commissions were provided authority by their legislatures to authorize
the issuance of securities by utilities associated with utility assets that
could affect the financial integrity of the utilities to the detriment of their
customers. This regulatory function does not require and should not involve any attempt at market surrogation by the commissions in the financial markets. It was designed to protect the asset base of utilities and
to regulate utility activity in the money markets just as regulation was
designed to deal with potential imprudence by utilities when participating
in other non-utility competitive markets.
Also, commissions were given the authority by their legislatures to
assure that the service provided by utilities is of reasonable quality. Quality
of service issues are not considered in depth in this paper because of the
concentration on economic and rate regulation.
F. Regulatory Process Development
The three basic elements of the economic regulation of utilities are the
CCN, rate regulation, and the regulation of utility securities and finance.
In general, they came about sequentially and approximately chronologically in that order in what can be interpreted as a natural progression.
That progression is described below:
1. THE CCN:
The CCN was the first element, and its purpose was to provide
control over entry into monopolistic utility markets. Chief Justice
Brandeis, in his 1932 dissent in New State Ice v. Liebmann, stated
that:
If the business is, or can be made, a public utility, it must be
possible to make the issue of a certificate a prerequisite to engaging
in it .... The limitation that is set by the due process clause ...
requires that the regulation shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious ... while, ordinarily, free competition . ... has been
encouraged, the public welfare may ... demand that monopolies
be created. Upon this principal is based our whole modem practice
of public utility regulation .... The certificate of public convenience
and necessity is the device ... through which the monopoly is kept
under effective control by vesting in a commission the power ...
to curtail the right to enter the calling.68
67. Capitalism, supra note 10, at 143-44.
68. New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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The overall purposes of CCN market entry control were intended
to (1) avoid duplication of facilities, (2) to avoid economic waste,
to avoid the use of unnecessary capital, (3) to protect the necessarily
significant utility investment (from incursion by utility competitors),
(4) to avoid ruinous and destructive competition, and (5) to avoid
the public inconvenience that results from the installation of, and
ultimate maintenance activities associated with, duplicative facilities
including overhead lines and underground pipes and conduits.'
The CCN was a good beginning, but, by itself, the CCN could
not avoid abusive pricing by the certified utilities for their monopolistic utility commodity.
2. Rates:
Rate abuses were the primary casus belli for the 1907 public utility
laws in New York. The regulation of utility rates was difficult to
structure because the reformers desired to keep the investor owned
utilities to be regulated within the American tradition of private sector
business rather than causing or allowing them to become municipal
or otherwise government owned. This structural goal was not only
difficult to achieve in the reform, but it has also been very difficult
to maintain over the years of actual regulatory practice. Martin Shapiro summarized the problem when he said that "[in short, regulatory statutes represent an uneasy compromise between laissez faire
and government control visions of the economy.'
3. Securities and Financing:
Even with the CCN and rate regulation, utilities still found ways
to abuse their rights by using their utility assets to support nonutility
investment and by other even more imaginative methods. Until 1930
only five states, California, Massachusetts, New York, Texas and
Wisconsin were exercising any authority over utility financing and
securities.
The holding company era of high-flying utility finance and associated questionable activities by utility executives such as the Samuel
Insull occurred in the years before and resulted in the passage of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935."' Beginning in 1930,
most of the states also amended their public utility laws to provide
for regulatory supervision of utility securities and financing.
The three elements, the CCN, rates, and securities, are each necessary elements of the whole of our delicately balanced system of
economic regulation of utilities. The process is adversely affected if
any part is ignored or is in some manner subverted. The threshold
element without which the entire process is meaningless is the CCN.
The CCN serves to establish the monopoly and to provide the nec69. Jones, supra note 53, at 514.
70. M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies 260-61 (1968).
71. 15 U.S.C. §77-79Z (1935).
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essary protections that are needed as an incentive for the large capital
investments and long term commitments that are inherent and absolutely needed for the effective and efficient operation of utilities.
Without CCN market entry control, rate regulation would, in theory,
be superfluous because competition would be allowed to exist for
utility territories and customers. Of course, history has shown us that
such utility competition has not worked as economic theory said it
should. The same applies to regulation of securities.
G. Related Historical Developments
There are a few additional historical details that are relevant to this
discussion as described below:
1. The Holding Company ERA
The electric utilities were most involved in the holding company practices that culminated in the 1920s and the early 1930s. By 1932, 16
electric utility holding companies controlled 75 percent of the electricity
produced in the United States. In fact, 49 percent was controlled by three
holding companies: the Electric Bond & Share Group (the predecessor
of General Electric), the Insull Empire, and the United Corporation (sponsored by J. P. Morgan & Company). Eleven gas pipeline systems controlled 80 percent of total pipeline mileage in that industry.72
The business practices of these utility holding company systems are
some of the most blatant examples of insider control and self-seeking.
In the 1930s Howard Hopson had managed to maintain control of the
huge Associated Gas & Electric holding company system with only $100,000
of voting stock. The structures of the utility holding company "empires"
of the era were fantastically complex. For example, the Georgia Power
Company was controlled by the Seaboard Public Service Company, which
was controlled by the National Public Service Corporation, which was
controlled by the Middle West Utilities Company, which was controlled
by Insull Utility Investments, Inc. which was controlled by the Corporation Securities Company of Chicago which was, in turn, controlled by
Insull Utility Investments which, presumably, it controlled. Of this entire
pyramid of companies, only the Georgia Power Company actually produced and sold electricity as a utility. The other companies existed only
for the purpose of financial speculation and profit. The investors in the
Insull empire ultimately lost every cent in the early 1930s." 3
Of the myriad abuses of utility holding companies, three general categories can sum up the worst of them: pyramiding, write-ups, and intercompany transactions. Combined and associated with these abuses,
72. D. Hawes, Utility Holding Companies 2.03 (1987); Electric Power, supra note 44, at 66.
73. Bach, supra note 17, at 319; Heilbroner, supra note 8, at 39.
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however, were deceptive accounting practices, exaggerated profits (especially from excessive service fees paid by subsidiary companies in the
pyramids), disbursement of unearned dividends, speculation in associated
equity stocks, and inattention to the day-to-day management and operation
of the subsidiary operating companies. 74
The utility holding company era provided some of the most interesting
of questionable business practices and examples of financial gamesmanship. Utility regulation, as a result, was honed to an even finer edge. For
example, the regulatory principle of the acquisition adjustment was refined
and further developed to preclude one of the many abusive practices of
the holding companies. Utility property had been sold and resold within
the holding companies between the subsidiary utilities. Its value was
inflated at each transaction thereby increasing the rate base and, under
the regulatory practice of the era, the return thereon, with the result of
artificially increasing the profitability of each subsidiary and of the entire
holding company.75
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,76 one of the strictest
federal laws ever created, was passed to correct the many abuses. It
performed its intended function very well and the problematic holding
companies were soon broken up or restructured. As of 1983, electric
utilities within registered holding companies amounted to about 20 percent
of the industry and for gas utilities amounted to approximately 8 percent.77
Disallowance Theory
The ability of a commission to disallow proven imprudent or excessive
expenses and costs of a utility in the determination of the utility's revenue
requirement for the setting of rates is a critical element of the rate regulation process. One way to express the nature of this authority is to say
that whereas a utility may spend its money any way it chooses, i.e., it
is utility management's prerogative to set the level of its expenses, it is
the regulator's duty to determine what expense burden the ratepayer must
bear.
This concept logically follows the regulatory market surrogation function in rate regulation. A competitive market does not publish or otherwise
transmit specific instructions to businesses setting out how they should
run their operations in order to be efficient and profitable. Competitive
businesses must observe, analyze, interpret, and react to the market as
74. Phillips, supra note 1,at 551-53.
75. Rateraking Trends in the 1980s at 51 (B. Radford ed., 1988); J.Bonbright, A. Danielson
& D. Kamerschen, Principles of Public Utility Rates 236 (1988).
76. 15 U.S.C. §79-79Z (1935).
77. Hawes, supra note 72, at 2.06.
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it actually operates to obtain guidance. If they make a mistake, they are
informed by the marketability of their product.
A commission cannot, if it is to perform as a surrogate for a competitive
market, tell utility management how to run its operation before the fact
of management decisions. Were commissions to do so, they would be
substituting for management, not surrogating for the market. The commission's final orders in rate cases provide market-like incentives for
utilities. A commission could not very well disallow an expense or cost
as imprudent before the expense is incurred nor can a commission determine, before the fact of a transaction, which transaction will be the
prudent one (unless commissions are somehow omniscient). To do so a
commission would be acting in real time as the utility's manager or as
some sort of special second level board of directors. That is not and
cannot be a function of government.
The United States Supreme Court in 1923 in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. the Missouri Public Service Commission declared that:
The Commission is not the financial manager of the corporation
and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore items charged by the
utility as operating expenses unless there is an abuse of discretion
in that regard by the corporate officers. 7"
The Court also decided in 1935 in West Ohio Gas Company v. the
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio that "[tlo disallow an expenditure,
a commission must prove 'an abuse of discretion' on the part of
management. Such an abuse, in turn, results from 'a showing of inefficiency or improvidence.'
3. Allowed Rate of Return
There are two landmark Supreme Court cases that are critical to the
determination of the rate of return that should and must be allowed to
regulated utilities. They are commonly known as Bluefield and Hope as
quoted below:
BLUEFIELD WATERWORKS v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
"A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn
a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that being made at the same time
78. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 289 (1923).
79. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63 (1935).
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and in the same general part of the country on investments in other
business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and
uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are
realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative
ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and
support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the
proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes
affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and business conditions generally."'8
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. HOPE NATURAL GAS CO.
"From the investor of the company point of view it is important
that there be enough revenues not only for operating expenses, but
also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on
the debt and dividends on the stock. By that standard the return to
the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investment
in other enterprises having commensurate risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integ8'
rity of the enterprise so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. " '
Controversy still exists over whether a utility's allowed rate of return
is really a guaranteed rate of return. Francis X. Welch very neatly explained the fallacy of the guaranteed rate of return notion as follows:
The Commission's function is simply to determine a rate of return
which will have the result of permitting a company to earn a fair
return, if the utility's earning power and other circumstances are such
that it can do sufficient business so as to permit it to cover its expenses
and obtain a reasonable return, over and above them .... Inother
words, the utility's return allowance might be compared with a fishing
or hunting license with a limit on the catch. Such a license does not
guarantee that the holder will catch anything at all; it simply makes
the catch legal (up to a specified limit) provided the holder is successful in his own efforts. 2
The source of the controversy that resulted in the Bluefield and Hope
cases came about in an interesting manner representative of the persistently changeable character of utility economics and relates back to the
seminal Smyth v. Ames case (1898) previously mentioned here.83 That
80. Bluefield Waterworks v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
81. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
82. Welch, supra note 51.

83. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.466 (1898).
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case came about, among other reasons, as a result of problems stemming
from the economic deflation that occurred during the late 1800s. Because
of the deflation, the reproduction cost of utility assets was less than the
original cost of the assets. As a result, ratepayers advocated valuation
for ratemaking based on reproduction cost while the utilities advocated
original cost.
The issue was met in Smyth v. Ames where the Court held that valuation
must be based upon fair value considerations including both original and
reproduction costs. However, the Court did not set out how fair value
should be determined or how either original or reproduction cost must
be used in the determination of fair value. The adversaries changed their
respective positions, however, when the.inflation brought about by World
War I turned the tables and reproduction cost became higher than original
cost. The ratepayers then began to advocate original cost and the utilities
advocated reproduction cost. The adversaries haggled for over 40 years
until the Court decided in Hope as follows:
We held that the Commission [FPC] was not bound to the use of
any single formula . . . in determining rates .... And when the
Commission's order is challenged in the courts, the question is whether
that order "viewed in its entirety" meets the requirements of the act.
Under the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is the result
reached, not the method employed, which is controlling."
The Hope decision resulted in movement toward the nearly universal
acceptance of original cost as the valuation standard. Further, the "end
result" doctrine established by Hope caused the primary emphasis in
utility rate cases to begin to shift from valuation to the determination of
fair rate of return.
4. The Monopoly Nature of Utilities
Many in the field still claim as a necessary premise for the regulation
of utilities that they are a monopoly and a natural monopoly. In fact,
since 1934 when the United States Supreme Court decided Nebbia v. New
York, such has not been the case in the United States. Justice Roberts
said in Nebbia that;

[tihe dairy industry is not ... a public utility ... there is ...
no suggestion of any kind of monopoly ... in no way dependent
upon public grants or franchises .... The phrase "affected with a
public interest" can . . . mean no more than that an industry, for
adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good.
84. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)
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"If. ..the conditions or practices in an industry make unrestricted
competition an inadequate safeguard of the consumer's interest, produce waste harmful to the public, or portend the destruction of the
industry itself, appropriate statutes . . may not be set aside ...
regulation ...is unconstitutional only if it is arbitrary, discrimi-

natory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free
to adopt. . .

.,,"

Further, the matter of the natural monopoly characteristic of utilities,
that being when unit costs decrease with increasing production, had been
brought into question as early as 1961 by James C. Bonbright when he
said that
"a natural monopoly results and. . . is due. . . to severely localized
and hence restricted markets for utility services-markets limited
because of the necessarily close connection between the utility plant
on the one hand and the customers' premises on the other. .

.

.Were

it compelled to share its limited market with two or more rival plants
owning duplicate distribution networks, the total cost of serving the
city would be materially higher. . . even if the unit cost of supplying
a given area with a given type of public utility service must increase
with an enhanced rate of output, any specified required rate of output
86
can be supplied most economically by a single plant or system.,
Many experts also claim that utilities are less of a monopoly than they
used to be. To some extent, that is true. There is greater opportunity
today for fuel switching by gas and electric utility customers, and there
is a greater possibility that a customer could simply substitute self generation for electric utility service. Other factors which have been brought
about artificially by government, such as cogeneration under the Federal
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)"7 and small
power systems and legislated open access transportation and by-pass
possibilities for gas service, are claimed to affect the monopoly status of
utilities. But even with all of this, the distribution monopoly certainly
still exists, and, if the history of our utilities does repeat itself, the rest
of the vertically integrated monopoly will likely return to wherever it was
before anyway. In 1985, Leonard S. Hyman said that "if competition
comes, it will not be through the radical measures proposed by academics .

.

85. Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
86. Bonbright, supra note 75, at 20.
87. PURPA is one of the five following acts which made up the National Energy Acts of 1978:
The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Public Law 95-6t7; The Energy Tax Act
(ETA), Public Law 95-618; The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA), Public Law
95-619; The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA), Public Law 95-620; The Natural Gas
Policy Act (NGPA), Public Law 95-621.
88. Hyman, supra note 30, at 282.
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H. The Regulatory Compact
The critical and dominating public interest characteristic of private
businesses such as public utilities that justifies their regulation by government dates all the way back to Lord Hale in the 1600s. The same
justification was clearly stated in the Munn v. Illinois decision in 1877,
and was reaffirmed by Nebbia in 1934. Utilities are still affected with the
public interest and it is upon that bedrock that the regulatory compact
was and still is founded.
The regulatory compact is the expression of the end result of the
cumulative actions that make up the history and development of the
economic regulation of utilities in the United States. The roots and sources
of the regulatory compact, therefore, go back to the earliest of economic
times and, even in the relatively youthful United States, its gestation took
over a century. It has allowed the majority of our utilities to remain in
the private sector of our economy, it has allowed our utilities to offer
their most essential contribution to the health and growth of our economy,
and it has provided utility customers with the most reliable and most
economic utility service available anywhere in the world.
Whereas the term "regulatory compact" is used frequently regarding
the regulation of private utilities by government in the United States,
there is no standard definition. It will be defined in this paper as the
expression of the nature and intent of the relationship between the regulated utilities and their investors, and the utilities' customers and the
general public. It is the set of mutual rights, benefits, and obligations
that exist for both the utilities and the public in the regulatory scheme.
As with every just and reasonable interaction, for every right or benefit
granted, there is a concomitant obligation.
The regulatory compact provides that (1) utilities give up certain rights
for the benefit of a monopoly territory granted by government, and that
(2) the customers of the utilities give up the right to choose the supplier
of the utility commodity within that territory for the assurance of government regulation of the price the utility may charge for that commodity.
Further, the regulatory compact is an ongoing mutual relationship between the customers of utilities and the general public, and utility managers and investors. That relationship is one of sensitive balance that
must be maintained under the long standing and common sense standards
of justness and reasonableness. As is the nature of such a compact, each
party, both the utilities and their customers, is obliged to accept the costs
as well as the benefits that can occur from time to time. Neither the
utilities nor their customers can pick and choose when it is convenient
to operate under the compact and then, later, choose to go back into the
compact with everything being forgiven.
The regulatory compact is not a switch that may be turned off every
now and then and then turned back on with the expectation of easy and
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immediate return to the former condition. When it is switched off, there
can be expected many and unpredictable dislocations and disturbances
that may not be readily correctable, if correctable at all. In order for the
regulatory compact to remain operable and effective, the sensitive balance
of its associated rights, benefits, and obligations must be maintained.
Government is the administrator, mediator, judge, and overseer of the
regulatory compact and, therefore, government has the primary responsibility for its maintenance. Most important, then, is the manner in which
government, through its regulatory commissions, state legislatures, the
Congress, and the courts, administers and assures the balanced continuation of the compact.
Finally, history shows that public interest based regulatory compact is
the foundation for the unique utility regulatory process found in the United
States. The social science of economics, the applied science of engineering, the practical discipline of accounting, and all manner of theories,
analyses, methods and practices are necessary in the actual practice of
the regulation of investor owned utilities, but such are the tools of application and not the reason and basis for utility regulation under the
regulatory compact. If this most basic lesson of history is lost sight of,
the tail of technocracy and academia will wag the dog of the primary
need to protect the public interest as expressed in the regulatory compact.
111. COMMENTARY ON CURRENT REGULATORY PRACTICES
A. Introduction
This section of this paper is intended to place certain current regulatory
trends in the context of history, the traditional regulatory process, and
the regulatory compact. In probably every instance of the trends discussed
there will be important issues not addressed because of the historical
approach taken. In such instances, it is not meant to indicate that the
other issues are not important. Rather, it is simply that the subject of this
paper is limited. Also, this section contains the opinions of the author
with respect to interpretation of the history previously presented in Section
II., to the manner in which our regulatory system is intended to operate,
and to the positive or negative nature of the current regulatory practices
discussed.
B. Selected Current Regulatory Practices
1. Open Access Natural Gas Transportation
Federal and state89 action at both the legislative and commission levels
have established or allowed open access for the transportation of natural
89. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-6-4.1 (1978, 1990 Supp.).
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gas in regulated interstate pipelines, intrastate pipelines and local distribution systems. Ultimate customers (at least the big ones) and those other
than the regulated utility providing them with a supply of gas have access
to the piping systems of the regulated utilities for the transportation of
their gas.
Underlying these government actions is the assumption that their action
will better replicate or allow for the performance of the classical economic
theory of competition and thereby all necessary protection of the public
interest will be virtually automatically assured as a result. It is further
claimed that competition so fostered will not only provide adequate protection, but that it will also assure a more economic and presumably less
costly but adequately reliable natural gas utility service.
A few already experienced results of open access is that it allows
"cream skimming" of the regulated utility systems-it is usually the
larger and better customers of the regulated entities that are "skimmed
off" and lost by the distribution utilities as a result of open access. In
addition, however, as is also allowed in many jurisdictions, the ultimate
bypass of the regulated utility system has occurred where the utilities lose
their revenue from transportation of the gas and where duplicative facilities are constructed. In both instances, the currently remaining customers
of the utilities and, should the phenomenon of competition disappear as
it has in the past, future utility customers will bear the cost of underused
and unnecessary facilities.
History indicates that cream skimming and bypass are undesirable with
respect to utilities. How and why are the circumstances of today different
than they were when the same actions were found to be something that
should be avoided-and to the extent that changes may have occurred,
are they truly important or may they even be undesirable? Further, have
the underpinnings of how economics really operates changed, or is it that
the theories have changed (but does changing a theory change the realities?), or are we simply applying again the same theories that haven't
worked before?
Another aspect of open access that must be considered is its relationship
to the regulatory compact. Open access significantly upsets the delicate
balance of the regulatory compact by having the effect of taking away
some of the rights and benefits of the regulated companies without adding
anything back for counterbalance. Similarly but compounding in effect,
it adds rights and benefits for customers (and potential customers) without
imposing any associated obligations. We are already seeing the manifestations of that imbalance in the skimming off of regulated utility customers
and the residual adverse effects on both the remaining utility customers
and the utilities and their investors. We are also seeing attempts by
legislatures and commissions to correct for these predictable manifestations.
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Should the apparent current natural gas supply abundance disappear,
and should duplicative facilities that will result from bypass become no
longer useful to anyone, it is likely that there will be an attempt to
reestablish the regulatory compact so as to restore order and reasonableness for both utility customers and the utility industry.
2. Electric Transmission Wheeling
Electric transmission wheeling, the transportation of electricity for others, absent some of the obvious differences having to do with both the
physical system in place and the physics of the two commodities, can be
thought of in essentially the same way as open access to natural gas
transportation systems. The same basic questions as to the potential modifications to regulatory practice are, therefore, also applicable and there
is no need to repeat them here.
3. Load Retention & Economic Development Rates
Load retention and economic development rates are rates 9° lower than
standard rates available to other similar customers, which lower rates are
intended to retain load (a customer or customers) that would otherwise
leave the system and no longer be customers of the system at all. The
need for load retention rates can arise from at least three sources. They
are (1) that there is greater availability of alternatives to utility commodities today, (2) that self-supply of utility commodities is frequently more
economically feasible than it was in the past, and (3) because of the
manifestations of the imbalance in the regulatory compact that was brought
about by open access for natural gas.
The first two instances demonstrate that utilities live in a more competitive business world than they did in the past. But that competition
does not cause their certified territory to be other than monopolistic as
regards their utility commodity. It does, however, function as an incentive
for utilities to optimize their efficiency so that their commodity can remain
economically marketable within their territory. The natural growth of the
real competition that exists without any more government "help" will
operate to maximize economic efficiency for all concerned without artificial government action such as special load retention rates for utilities.
The effect of government-initiated open access or wheeling is to allow
utility customers to seek lesser cost supply and for nonutility producers
to skim the cream off the utility's market territory with the attraction of
lower cost gas or electricity. Such access would not be allowed under the
traditional regulatory compact. Utilities must necessarily plan for long90. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-6-26 (1978, 1990 Supp.).
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run supply requirements to be able to meet their statutory obligation to
provide adequate and reliable service to all who require it in their certified
territory. As a natural result, there will likely be periods when, for the
short-run, alternate supplies may be cheaper. The ultimate beneficiary, if
there are short-run aberrations during which the regulatory -compact is
suspended, will be neither the utility customers nor the utility. They are
the ones who will have to pick up the pieces when the bubble bursts.
Review of the literature seems to indicate that load retention rates and
economic development rates are considered to be synonymous terms.
They are not the same. Load retention rates are intended to retain existing
customers and load while economic development rates are intended to
attract new customers or expanded service to existing customers, i.e.,
economic development.
The current trend toward electric utility economic development rates
appears to be the result of two circumstances. One is the matter, certainly
not new, of the relative cost of utility commodities to potential large
commercial and industrial customers between different utility service territories. Differing utility costs between utilities can affect decisions to
locate, or to relocate, industrial and commercial facilities. The other is
the current excess capacity in some parts of the country. The net result
is the expressed desire to be able to offer special, and presumably lower,
rates to certain prospective or expanding customers for the purpose of
economic development.
Regarding the regulatory compact, the unavoidable result of such lower
rates for selected customers, even for the purpose of economic development, is discrimination against the remaining unselected customers.
The justifications are based on benefiting the unselected customers through
greater future economies of scale. It is, however, "betting on the come"
of a presumed result. It must be assumed that proposed (or current)
discriminatory economic development rates are acceptable because of the
possible future benefits that may result if the economic development really
does happen, and happens in a manner that allows for such future benefits
to be passed on to the then current ratepayers (who may not be the same
ratepayers who suffered from the initial discriminatory rates).
It seems unquestionable that load retention and economic development
rates are discriminatory. They are available to some similarly situated
customers and not to others. But utility regulatory statutes do not preclude
all discrimination; they just preclude undue discrimination. It is generally
accepted that rates are unduly discriminatory if they are at less than
variable costs of service. But the matter of undue discrimination does
not lend itself only to formulistic or calculable considerations.
Economic development rates, in particular, can result in unfair treatment not only to competitors within a utility's territory, but can also result
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in unfair treatment of other utilities competing for the same new business.
If one utility is allowed a special economic development rate and another
is not, either by the same or different regulatory bodies, fairness cannot
be the result.
Economic development and load retention rates are an expedient which
can be hoped to be a temporary phenomenon. They are not representative
of any classical concept of competition-they are a highly administered
pricing mechanism agreed to between the government and industry bureaucracies.
Further, investor owned utility businesses are not the proper vehicle
for use by government to foster economic development any more than
utility or any other free enterprise businesses are the proper vehicle for
the pursuit of social welfare goals. Utilities and other private businesses
are not supposed to be directly manipulated by government for the redistribution of wealth. If the Congress, legislature, or local government
sees fit to do such things, let it be done within their own special bailiwicks-taxation and social welfare.
4. Deregulation of Electric Generation
Whereas it is the common belief that electric distribution systems will
probably have to be dealt with under traditional utility regulation, it has
become popular wisdom that certainly the generation component of vertically integrated electric utilities and, if the mandatory transportation of
electricity for others (transmission wheeling) can be brought into being
in some manner, electric transmission as well ought to be deregulated.
Again, the trend is based on the notion that competition will do all that
is needed to protect the public interest.
Utilities have had and do have the characteristic of being capital intensive as well as being affected with the public interest, and the generation of electricity for or by utilities is no exception. History seems to
indicate that, when such industries function in a competitive mode, they
tend to return to or toward monopolistic operation.
Stated in human terms, utility executives can understandably get fidgety
when the huge investment in their utility plant is threatened by price
competition. A natural reaction appears to start with price undercutting
when sales are lost to another's lower prices. That initial action then
similarly threatens their competitors who react in the same manner, the
ultimate motivation of both probably being an attempt to assure coverage
of their unavoidable fixed costs, and in particular, their debt service and
dividends for their investors. The next step is price fixing or cartelization
for mutual protection, and the final step is combination or merger which
establishes, or reestablishes, something like a monopoly.

Spring 19921

CURRENT UTILITY REGULATION

Stated in other terms, what has happened and what probably will happen
to deregulated generation can be described by the theory of oligopoly.
The two important requirements for oligopoly are the need for large-scale
production relative to the size of the market and the need for low cost
output, and barriers (financial or otherwise) against the entry of new
firms, which barrier can be simply the size needed for efficient production.
All of this seems to fit deregulated generation very nicely. If what has
been called in the past destructive or ruinous competition should recur
among the unregulated generators, the likely result will be price fixing
and market sharing agreements which will ultimately result in de-facto
cartels and the same old movement toward de-facto monopoly.
Unfair price cutting, which can reasonably be expected in an oligopoly,
is illegal-but can unfair price cutting be easily distinguished from price
cutting reflecting truly more efficient operation? How is the line between
positive aggressive price competition and agreements to 'stabilize price
in the case of such cartel-like operation identified? The operation of such
a cartel is not very different from the characteristics of a monopoly as
regards the setting of price and the control of the market. In fact, it may
be argued that it would demonstrate the worst characteristics of monopolies without any of the possible benefits. 9 '
What has been described above in common sense and human terms
has happened before-the tendency for utilities and other capital intensive
business affected with the public interest to move toward oligopoly and
monopoly-and there seems to be a dearth of studies, analyses or investigations attempting to prove that it won't happen again. In fact, the
phenomenon previously described, that is the concentration of competing
capital intensive businesses into oligopoly, appears to be happening right
now among the deregulated airlines (which deregulation occurred in the
late 1970s). Also, airline fares are not down on other than the major and
most profitable routes which, in my opinion, results in the neglect of the
interest of the public who either do not live on those major routes or who
must for whatever reason travel those neglected routes to and within the
hinterlands. The availability of flights on other than the profitable routes
and the quality and safety of service in general also appears to have
declined dramatically.
Whereas it may be arguable that there has been some overall cost
reduction to a segment of the flying public, there has also been imposed
increased congestion and delay costs. There has also emerged a clear and
obvious trend toward little functional price competition (many of the
"special" low rates are the same for all airlines serving the same routes),
91. Bach, supra note 17, at 482-88'
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consolidation, merger, and the return toward the oligopoly/monopoly.
Further, there is increasing pressure in the press and in Congress toward
what can only be described as reregulation.92
The observations regarding the airlines can also be related back to the
history of the railroads. The New York to Chicago railroad market of a
century ago is an example. There were four main routes in the market
area. They all had very large fixed investment and fixed costs of operation,
and the variable costs of adding a few more cars or even scheduled trains
were minimal compared to those fixed costs. Those owning and operating
those competing routes began price-cutting and cut-throat competition.
But, all the while, each maintained their short haul rates along their own
routes where there were no practical alternatives for the shippers. It
usually cost more to ship lesser distances within an operator's route than
to ship all the way between New York and Chicago. The result was
similar to today's unregulated airlines-"special" fare price-undercutting;
low fares between major centers and high fares to less popular destinations. The final result was combination of companies and fewer operators.
If the hoped for benefits of utility competition among electric generators
and transmitters doesn't happen as expected, will it be possible to retrace
our path so as to cause the least harm to utility customers, the utilities,
and our industrial economy as a whole?
Elements of the regulatory compact are also affected. A historical
reason for the development of the CCN is the protection of investment
in utility plant from competitors. That protection for existing utility transmission and generation plant would be lost with deregulation. Further,
there is no reason why generating companies will not fail resulting in the
possibility of duplicative facilities thereby wasting our precious capital
and resurrecting the concern over economic waste. In fact, a basic presumption of classical competition implies that very result because intrinsic
in that theory is that competition will drive out those operators who are
less competitive. The only alternative, then, is to assume that all unregulated generation firms will be nearly perfectly efficient and operating
in a nearly perfectly efficient market-an unlikely assumption.93
Also, the matter of concern over the inconvenience to the public, and
the unnecessary environmental degradation as well, that can result from
such duplication is given short shrift. What will happen to electric generation businesses who cannot meet the assumption of economic perfection? Who will pay for the waste of capital and the unnecessary and
possibly deleterious environmental impacts? In all likelihood it will be
92. E. Kahn, Structural Evolution in the Electric Utility Industry. 125 No. I Pub. Utils. Fort. 9

(1990).
93. Blake, Examining the Dark Side of Competition, Pub. Utils. Fort. 25 (Dec. 1990).
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the general public by means of reregulation, nationalization or municipalization.
5. Excess Capacity
Excess electric generation capacity has attracted much regulatory attention in the sections of the country where it exists. How that excess
capacity came about and how it can be dealt with under the regulatory
compact needs also to be explored.
One reason for the current capacity excesses is faulty forecasts for the
future demand for electricity, which forecasts were made in the 1970s.
There are two relevant aspects to the matter of the electricity demand
forecasts of the late 1970s. They are the nature of the forecasting that
was later found to be problematic, and, a traditional form of regulatory
response to that problem.
The need for electric generating capacity had grown at a rate of nearly
eight percent during the 1960s and at nearly seven percent in the early
1970s. Electric utilities were still projecting demand growth at between
five and six percent in the late 1970s, although experienced growth rates
were already declining rapidly. Installed generating capacity was increased significantly as a result of plant construction that was begun during
the 1970s, but no new nuclear plants have been ordered since 1978, and
most that were ordered are now completed and in service. A critical factor
affecting the decision to build new base station generation, nuclear or
otherwise, is the fact that the lead time from the decision to construct
and actual operation can be ten years or more."
Regarding the nature and methodology used in the forecasts back in
the 1970s, it is interesting to note that the then new field of "econometrics" came into prominence in the early years of that decade. Econometrics, or the application of mathematical and statistical methods to
economic modeling, was the supporting methodology for many of the
utility load forecasts of the era.95
Another way of looking at the problem of demand forecasting is to
recognize that the new and very mathematically complex and computersupported econometric forecasts represented a picture of the future which
was difficult for anyone to refute. When the forecasts proved to be wrong,
it is arguable that the problematic outcome was not the fault of the
analyses, but rather because the real world markets refused to cooperate
with the myriad assumptions inherent in the forecasting methodology.96
94. C. Studness, The Electric Utilities During the 1970s and 1980s, 125 No. 4 Pub. Utils. Fort.
40 (1990); M. Yokell, The Decline and Fall of the Regulated Electric Utility Industry, 125 Pub.
Utils. Fort. (1990).
95. Hudson, supra note 7, at II.
96. Miller, supra note 16, at 107.
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Even the United States Supreme Court had to deal with the matter of
the advancing technology of analysis as early as the 1940s when it said,
in Colorado Interstate Gas Company v. the Federal Power Commission
that "[aillocation of costs is not a matter for the slide rule. It involves
judgment on a myriad of facts. It has no claim to an exact science."' 97
The slide rule of that era was not nearly as intimidating as the computer
of today to those not intimately familiar with either. Of course, with
respect to forecasting demand for electricity, it is true that the demand
decreased at a rate that hardly anyone expected anyway, whether the basis
for their speculation was complex econometrics or just the seat of the
pants .
Excess capacity also has to do with the regulatory compact and the
compact affects the matter of regulatory response to the problem. The
regulatory compact sets up an ongoing and mutual relationship between
the utilities and their consumers. It cannot be treated as a fair weather
agreement by either party, or more importantly, by the regulators who
are the caretaker of the regulatory compact.
The initial regulatory determination must be whether or not the forecasts
and the utility management decisions, from which resulted the now excess
capacity, were made in good faith and with the use of the prudenit wisdom
and judgment of the time when the decisions were made. If, for instance,
it cannot be proven that the decisions were imprudent and an abuse of
discretion by the utilities when they were made, a commission cannot
then inject its current judgment as a substitute for the prior judgment of
the utility executives and directors.
The regulator must, however, under the regulatory compact, employ
its impartial and knowledgeable judgment to reasonably allocate the resultant costs of excess capacity between the investors in the utility and
the customers. Neither will be satisfied, but neither can expect fair weather
treatment in such instances-they must somehow each be treated by the
regulator as evenhandedly as possible in such a manner that they fairly
share the bad with the good. The customers cannot expect perfection
from the utilities that serve them and the utility investors cannot expect
to benefit from unsatisfactory outcomes even when the cause was neither
improper or imprudent on their part. Again, history never did tell us that
the regulation of utilities was supposed to be easy. It is never likely that
some realistic magic formula will pop up to avoid the need for difficult,
and frequently uncomfortable, informed and impartial judgment by utility
regulators.
97. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
98. Hudson, supra note 7, at 5, 15, 16, 23, 41; K. Nagatani, Political Macroeconomics 76, 77
(1989).
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6. An Unintended Combination & Conflict; Social versus
Economic Regulation
It is now recognized that there will be the need for the development
of significant new electric generating capacity beginning in the 1990s.
Along with that recognition there has been much concern expressed over
the problems that arose out of the development of new generating capacity
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Again, the utility regulatory process
has been blamed as a major cause for the problem. As a result, there
have been many proposals for structural changes in the regulatory process
combined with organizational changes for the industry, nearly all of which
involve the deregulation of all or portions of the electric utility industry.
A part of the regulatory process component of the problem may have
been to a great extent brought about by a well meaning but unintentionally
problematic change in the regulatory process. During the late 1960s and
over the next ten years or so, the purpose and application of the CCN
was amended so as to provide for more efficient and timely "one stop
shopping" for government approval of new generating and transmission
capacity.
That goal was certainly admirable, but a probably inadvertent outcome
of the amended approval process was the mixing of the economic regulatory function of the CCN with social regulation functions. Utility
economic and rate regulation is economic, not social regulation. Economic regulation as applied to utilities has to do with market entry control
and utility commodity pricing. Social regulation, on the other hand, has
to do directly with the public safety, public health, and the environment.
This mixing of different regulatory functions led to misunderstandings
and difficulty with, in particular, the economic regulatory function.
The attention of the economic regulators was diverted from the primary
purposes of the CCN and its critical nature in the process for which it
was originally created. The name for the product of the amended regulatory approval process was still the CCN, but its function was radically
changed. It became a common perception that the granting of a CCN
was a licensing procedure rather that its originally intended market entry
control function.
The primary purpose for the economic regulation of public utilities is
the protection of the public interest from potential monopolistic abuses.
Social regulation in this context involves health, safety, environmental
regulation and location control for generating and transmission facilities.
The public utility laws, however, were amended to include health, safety
and environmental regulation as extensions of the historical requirements
associated with the CCN, hence, the mixing of regulatory functions. This
mixing usually provided for no particular recognition of the fact that a
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particular facility could satisfy all health, safety and environmental concerns while failing to meet the traditional economic regulatory standards,
and vice-versa.
With respect to electric generating and transmission facilities, the five
original purposes as previously identified herein for the CCN can be
related as follows:
(1) The threshold market entry purpose is usually not applicable
in consideration of new electric generating or transmission facilities
for an already existing and certified utility.
(2) The matter of duplication and economic waste with respect to
generating plants can be applicable with the development of transmission grids and power pooling along with the potential for alternatives to traditional utility central station electricity generation. This
issue does, as well, demonstrate the need for more regional consideration in electric utility planning and in the approval consideration
process.
(3) The issue of protection of incursion by other providers of the
already certified utility service is usually not particularly applicable
because such planned facilities usually do not affect a utility's right
to serve in a certified territory and because the facility under consideration will likely be considered in relation to the facilities of
others that are already in place, already approved or already under
consideration within the existing or planned grid.
(4) The matter of cutthroat competition is one of the principal
historical reasons that our regulatory system came into existence.
That issue does not surface under traditional regulation, but it may
reappear if elements of the industry are deregulated.
(5) The "inconvenience" of duplicative facilities can be logically
extended to include the issue of the associated potential for unnecessary environmental degradation. But that particular environmental
concern is limited to the matter of duplication-it does not include
or provide for consideration as to the environmental aspects of where
a necessary, and not duplicative, facility should be located.
It is in this fifth area, which now includes the location control of
necessary facilities, where the amended laws extended the function of
the CCN outside of its intended economic regulatory bounds and created
the mixing of regulatory purposes. The most serious outcome of the
resulting diversion of purposes was the manner in which the CCN was
thought about with respect to the investment associated with the facility
under consideration. The CCN was never intended to provide any form
of regulatory approval of the amount or even, necessarily, the particular
purpose of the utility investment in such facilities. The regulation of
securities and rates, which necessarily and structurally include the matter
of the propriety of investment by utilities, can only come after, and not
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within, the consideration of the CCN. Further, the CCN never was intended to be and can not be a device by which all risk is removed from
investment decisions made by utilities.
As a result of the mixing of regulatory functions and the resultant
diversions, the new hybrid CCN became potentially interpretable by both
those in the utility industry and by regulators, to be an approval of
investment in addition to the appropriate functions of a CCN. Neither
the industry nor the regulators should have allowed this misconception
to arise. The electric utility industry, under other circumstances, would
not be likely to invite their regulators into their boardrooms as a partner
in their investment decisions. To do so is to open the door for ultimate
control, not regulation, of the industry by government. Neither would
regulators want to so limit their ability to perform their proper functions
in the security and rate regulatory aspects of their job. Two wrongs can't
be expected to produce a right.
To state the effect of the problem of mixing regulatory functions another
way, whereas it may not have been a direct cause of the problems we
are facing today, it did contribute to allowing the problems to happen.
If it came, inadvertently or not, to be believed that a CCN did somehow
and should approve the amount and nature of the investment by a utility
in a facility, how then could the regulators or other affected parties rationally consider the rate regulatory aspects and impacts of such a facility?
The resulting confusion of purpose contributed to the virtual panic of
public and political pressure, and ultimately intervenor pressure in hearings, that was imposed on the regulators to (frequently) entirely disallow
associated facility costs. It surely did not tend to provide an atmosphere
that would foster coolly and impartially considered regulatory decisions
on such difficult matters. Certainly regulation could not function in its
intended market surrogate role in rate regulation if it was somehow believed that the utility's investment had already been "approved" in the
granting of a CCN for a facility. The confusion may have provided for
a regulatory over-reaction of disallowance as a compensation for the
perceived "errors" of prior CCN approvals.
The confusion of purposes was also probably contributed to by the fact
that many of the amended state laws caused the decision making on CCN
approvals for new electric facilities to be "by committee." By that I
mean that in many instances the CCN decision was no longer made by
the utility economic regulatory agency alone, but included other agencies
in the decision making process, which other agencies had no reason to
be familiar with the economic regulatory purposes of the CCN. The other
agencies participating in the decision were probably, and understandably,
primarily concerned with their own provincial interests. The mixing of
purposes placed highly specialized environmental concerns as to facility
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location into the hands of usually unprepared economic regulators, and,
on the other hand, placed economic regulatory concerns, assuming they
were recognized at all, into the hands of equally unprepared non-economic
social regulators.
7. Prudence Reviews
The subject of prudence reviews, albeit orders of magnitude larger,
essentially similar to any other potential disallowance of a utility cost or
expense. Review of management actions by regulators after the fact of
management action is in accordance with and, in fact, has always been
a necessary and primary structural element of the utility regulatory process
and the regulatory compact. A principle objective of the economic regulation of utilities by government is to limit cost recovery from ratepayers
to prudently incurred costs plus a fair return.
It has been claimed that prudence reviews associated with large investments such as nuclear generating plant construction is new thing and
came as a surprise to the industry. The magnitude of expense or investment
is irrelevant to the economic regulators obligation to assure that rates
only include prudently incurred costs. The fact of prudence review should
not have been a surprise to anyone. The tremendous magnitude of investment in such as base station nuclear plants was, however, new to the
regulatory process in the 1970s. Until the 1960s, the cost of the development of generating capacity came in much smaller increments and the
potential for disallowance was, therefore, much smaller as well.
Larger investments, however, caused the long-standing regulatory obligation for assuring that only prudent costs and expenses be allowed in
customer rates to become much more complex, much more difficult, and
caused it to attract much more public attention as well. The regulator's
job of finding a reasonable and fair balance of treatment of potential
disallowance under the regulatory compact became monumental. The
regulatory compact requires a long-term view of impacts on utility customers, the investors in the utilities, and the public-at-large that can be
affected by such regulatory decisions.
Emphasis must be made on the after the fact nature of regulatory
prudence review. If it were to be before the fact, it would not be substitution by the regulator for the market in which the utility's commodity
is sold, but rather substitution by the regulator for the function of management. It is utility management's job to operate efficiently and prudently
within the existing unregulated and other markets in which a utility procures labor, services, equipment, materials, et cetera. As previously stated
here, if it cannot be proven that a utility's decision was imprudent and
an abuse of discretion at the time made, a regulatory body cannot properly
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later apply its current judgment with twenty-twenty hindsight in support
of a prudence disallowance."
There was, however, a critical departure from traditional regulatory
practice that accompanied the large disallowances that have and still are
occurring associated with major utility generation facility investment.
That departure is a shift in the burden of proof from the regulatory staff
and intervenors to the utility. Historically, alleged instances of imprudent
utility expenditure and investment were introduced into regulatory proceedings either by the regulatory staff or by intervenors. That makes
perfect common sense because it is not very likely that a utility would
introduce claims of its own imprudence into a proceeding. Once introduced, those parties claiming imprudence bore the burden of proving the
imprudence. However, in recent practice, that burden has been shifted
to the utility who now bear the primary burden, when such allegations
are made by another party, of proving that their actions were not imprudent. "
Further, even the definition of imprudence seems to have been shifted
as well so that any decision or isolated component of a decision that is
less than optimal may be considered imprudent. The shifting of the burden
of proof and the shifting of the definition of imprudence created what in
practical reality is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Recognizing that investment
in electric generation facilities can run into billions of dollars, common
sense alone dictates that no utility will be able to prove that no part of
-their investment was less than optimal and, by that standard, imprudent. '
The magnitude of the disallowances associated with prudence reviews
during the last decade, especially as it relates to nuclear power generation
plants, is noteworthy. There are now 111 nuclear units operating in 33
states which are generating nearly 20 percent of all electricity used in the
United States. Eight nuclear generating units are still under construction,
but only two of them have projected operating dates. There have been,
however, more than 100 cancellations or indefinite deferrals of planned
nuclear units since the 1970s and there have been no new nuclear plants
ordered since 1978. Of the plants in operation or nearing operation, there
have been regulatory prudence disallowance associated with 19 plants.
Some $9,922,500,000 has been disallowed of a total investment of
$82,876,000,000 which amounts to 12 percent having been disallowed. 2
99. J. Anderson, Are Prudence Reviews Necessary, 127 No.3 Pub. Utils. Fort. 23, 24 (1991).
100. C. Studness, The Regulatory Compact that Never Was, 128 No. 5 Pub. Utils. Fort. 34, 35

(1991).
101. Id.
102. M. Yates, Nuclear Energy. A Failed Promise or a Promising Future, 126 Pub. Utils. Fort.
12 (1990) Anderson, supra note 99.
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It is the very magnitude of nuclear plant disallowances that has caused
the utility industry to become very leery and hesitant about investment
in new generating plants. As a result, there is reason for concern about
electric generating capacity shortages in some regions of the country
during the 1990s.
A prudence review, in the context of a rate proceeding, is an appropriate
and necessary expression of the regulatory prerogative and duty to investigate the actions of utility management. It is in its regulatory application, the determination and treatment of the amount of disallowance
of costs or expenses found to be imprudent, that the informed and impartial
judgment of the regulator in light of the regulatory compact becomes
critical. Again, an elusive balance must be achieved so that the purpose
and continuity of the regulatory compact is maintained and the job of
finding that balance lies with the regulator. As Mr. Paul L. Gioia, former
chairman of the New York Public Service Commission, said "[tihe traditional regulatory compact provided great benefits to the public and for
that system to work it must be balanced. It cannot be followed when it
is beneficial to ratepayers and discarded when it is politically inconvenient."° 3
8. Competitive Bidding
Competitive bidding for the supply of electricity is another example
of the rediscovery of the theoretical benefits of competition in and among
the providers of utility commodities and services. In general, the same
comments are applicable as have been made previously regarding open
access natural gas transportation, electric transmission wheeling and the
deregulation of electric generation.
The need for more laws and rules in the attempt by government to
create another artificial competitive market is questionable. If such a
market is artificially created (as was PURPA' cogeneration and small
power production), how can its operation be said to prove anything regarding economic theory. In fact, it seems entirely contrary to basic theory
because the rules (not guidelines) of a government established market are
not created by the market itself, but are rather established exogenously
by a non-market entity-the government. I again refer to Mr. Leonard
S. Hyman who said "if competition comes, it will not be through the
radical measures proposed by academics.
103. P. Gioia, The Prudence Standard: Recent Experience and Future Relevance, 123 No. 9
Pub. Utils. Fort. 11,16 (1989).
104. The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617.
105. Hyman, supra note 30, at 282.

.
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Further, to the extent that it may in some instances make good economic
sense for utilities to participate in the markets for electricity associated
with the movement toward government initiated competitive bidding in
electricity markets, it has never been shown that it is possible to legislate
good sense. Nothing now prevents utilities from so participating in such
markets if they find it to be advisable and good business to do so.
9. Municipalization
Another current trend, although one not initiated within or by the
regulatory community, is the matter of municipalities attempting to use
their franchise power regarding utilities to shop for suppliers of electricity
or even to take over the ownership and operation of investor owned utility
facilities located within a municipality. These actions are frequently referred to as "municipalization" and are similar in concept to the "nationalization" of private enterprise, including utilities, as it occurred in
the United Kingdom and France after World War II. This trend can have
dramatic effects on the regulatory compact and on the CCN, especially
in instances where the municipality makes up only a part of the territory
served by the incumbent utility.
Municipalization is an obvious departure from the regulatory compact.
There is reason to be concerned that municipalization will be a fair weather
departure from the regulatory compact where, in a few years, there would
be as much and probably more pressure to return to the traditional regulated monopoly as there is now to take advantage of attractive, but
possibly short-run, benefits.
. I will employ the State of New Mexico as an example to develop a
discussion of the problems associated with municipalization. A number
of cities in New Mexico are currently considering municipalization where
a portion of an incumbent utility's system would be affected. First, municipalization can destroy the integrity of the CCNs granted by the State
of New Mexico through its Public Service Commission (NMPSC) to the
currently serving utilities. Second, the value of affected regulated utilities
as business entities could be greatly reduced. Third, the remaining customers on the utility systems from which a portion is taken could be
adversely affected.
All investor owned utilities in New Mexico must have CCNs which
are granted and administered by a State agency, the NMPSC. It is logical
to conclude that the NMPSC is obliged to prevent interference by local
government entities such as a city into the NMPSC's area of jurisdiction
because it is clear that the Legislature in New Mexico vested in the
NMPSC the exclusive power to regulate and supervise public utilities,
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and that exclusive power includes the CCN for the purpose of market
entry control.
The matter of municipalization is-further complicated by the fact that
utilities, in addition to a CCN, must also obtain a franchise from each
local government jurisdiction in which they operate. The New Mexico
State Constitution precludes the possibility of the granting of exclusive
franchises by local governments. The local franchise only establishes the
utility's right to locate its facilities in the streets, alleys and public rightsof-way controlled by the local government. Further, in New Mexico the
NMPSC has no regulatory jurisdiction over municipal utilities-NMPSC
jurisdiction is, with some specific exceptions, essentially limited to investor owned utilities. In some states the state utility commission has full
regulatory jurisdiction over municipal utilities and other states the state
utility commission at least has jurisdiction over CCN territorial matters
including municipal utilities.
Even recognizing the state constitution's preclusion of exclusive local
government franchises, the matter of the effect of the CCN as regards
the value of the rights and privileges granted thereby cannot be ignored.
An investor owned utility has, through the CCN granted by the state,
been granted a vested property right and that such property right could
not be usurped by a governmental entity without payment of just compensation. Such an action would amount to a taking for public use without
compensation in violation of both the federal and state constitutions.
Further, should a municipality be able to take such utility property, it
would result in the use of such authority as a governmental unit to place
itself in a position where it could pick and choose among the state certified
utility company's lawful customers and territories which would constitute
"cream skimming" or "cherry picking" of the lawfully certified customers and certified territory of an investor owned utility by a municipality.
Such a taking by a municipality of certified utility territory, even when
such territory is located within the boundaries of the municipality, would
be improper without just compensation. The same applies to instances
where a municipality currently operating a municipal utility annexes territory being served by an investor owned utility. The serving investor
owned utility has a state-granted CCN and the act of annexation by a
municipality does not void that CCN and its associated property right.
Also, the policy of the State of New Mexico, as expressed in its Public
Utility Act (NMPUA), is to avoid unnecessary duplication and economic
waste among utilities when it is stated in the Declaration of Policy in the
NMPUA that:
... to the end that capital and investment may be encouraged and
attracted so as to provide for the construction, development and
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extension, without unnecessary duplication and economic waste, of

proper plants and facilities for the rendition of service to the general
public and to industry. (emphasis added)'0 6
Although the NMPSC has no jurisdiction over municipal utilities, it
would be illogical and contrary to the stated policy of the State if the
preclusion of unnecessary duplication and economic waste among utilities
were not to be somehow applicable to all utilities, including municipal
utilities as well as to investor owned utilities. Particularly in the case of
a threat to the CCN of an NMPSC regulated utility, it would seem, then,
that the NMPSC must be obliged to pursue whatever action available to
it to maintain that State policy, even to the extent of challenging the
actions of non-jurisdictional utilities when that policy would be subverted
thereby.
A principal historical reason that CCNs exist is to protect an incumbent
utility's investment as well as that needed for the future. The investors
in the certified serving utilities did rely on and have the right to rely on
the condition of and on the exertion of NMPSC authority. The affected
utility's economic future, represented by its growth potential, must necessarily include its entire territory as certified by the NMPSC. Should a
city take some of a serving utility's certified territory, particularly without
the NMPSC having exercised its obligation to protect the CCN they
granted, the investor's reliance on the authority of the NMPSC would be
adversely affected. The NMPUA, again in its Declaration of Policy, states
that "[i]t is the declared policy of the state that the public interest, the
interest of consumers and the interest of investors require the regulation
and supervision of such public utilities ... .
Also, should it result that a certified serving utility does lose certified.
territory as a result of a taking by a city, there could be adverse effects
on the remaining ratepayers of the currently serving utility. A critical and
long standing element of utility rate regulation is that the investors in a
utility must be assured of an allowed rate of return at least equal to that
earned by enterprises of similar risk. The loss of a portion of certified
territory will go to increase the perceived risk (by way of lost growth
potential) of its current and future investors thereby increasing the cost
of the utility's capital and its customer rates. The cost of capital is an
element of the cost of utility service which is covered by the payment of
rates by its customers.
Finally, should a city take any of a utility's certified territory, it should
not be able to do so without compensating the utility for the value of any
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-3-1(B) (1978).
107. N.M. Stat. Ann. §62-3-1(B) (1978).
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affected land, property, plant, equipment, rights and lost earnings associated with the territory lost. Even when it is as yet undeveloped, such
territory represents to the certified utility future earnings when it is developed and the utility exercises its CCN right to provide utility service
to the area.As a minimum, a city so taking a utility's property or property rights
must have the burden to fairly compensate the utility for the present value
of the loss of all reasonably expected future earnings. That compensation
must reflect not only the specific lost earnings in the territory specifically
taken, but also the impacts of the remaining utility system including any
land, plant, equipment and rights adversely affected by the taking. To
reiterate, just compensation does not include simply the fair market value
of the specific property taken within the municipality, it is rather the
difference between the fair market value of the entire utility system before
and after the taking, including all severance effects and consequential
damages. Without just compensation, there would be adverse effects on
both the customers of and the investors in the affected utility. Just compensation in the instance of such a municipal taking must result in the
utility's customers and investors being indifferent to the taking.
In addition, any claim that municipal utility services will necessarily
be cheaper than the same services provided by an investor owned utility
may not true. Such claims are usually based on three elements; lower
taxes, lower debt costs, and no profit requirement for municipal utilities.
With respect to taxes, such a claim can only rely on income taxes.
Plain common sense dictates that a municipality is not going to give up
local taxes when it acquires or operates a utility in lieu of a privately
owned, and taxable, utility. In fact one almost always finds a line item
in a municipal utility's cost of service entitled "in lieu of taxes." That
line item provides for the collection of "lost taxability" from the municipal utility's consumers for such as ad valorem and other local taxes.
It even makes sense to do so-if such municipal revenue should be
collected from utility consumers, it shouldn't matter who owns or operates
the utility.
Municipal utilities do not pay income taxes. However, there is also a
broader issue that affects the matter of avoidance of income tax in such
as an instance where a municipality takes over the operation of an income
tax paying utility. The argument that the tax won't be paid by the municipality associated with its utility operations is factual, but it is essentially provincial and usually ignores that fact the true outcome is that a
different ox winds up getting gored. To sum the issue up simplistically,
somebody's going to have to come up with the avoided income tax revenue
for the government, state and federal. The government's requirement for
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income tax revenue doesn't go away, it just gets shifted to someone else-and it may get shifted to the wrong taxpayers.
With regard to lower debt costs, municipalities may, under certain
circumstances, have access to tax-free debt instruments. It is not necessarily true, however, that the ultimate debt service cost of municipalities
as it affects the rates .paid by its utility consumers will result in lower
rates than would result for a privately owned utility. It is dependent on
many factors such as the relative financial rating of the entities, the market
at the time of issue, the indenture requirements of the debt issues, the
accounting conventions used, the rate development analyses employed,
and other policies of the entities.
As to the profit requirement, sometimes a rose by another name will
smell just as sweet. In an article in a recent issue of "Public Power"
which is the journal of the American Public Power Association (APPA)
it is stated that "[it is generally accepted that it is appropriate to, transfer
a portion of utility revenues to the municipal general fund. . . ." The
APPA is the national association of municipal electric utilities. The article
goes on to state that "most agree that the owners of a utility are entitled
to a fair and reasonable return on investment ... (and that) .. .the
general fund transfer can be viewed as a dividend to the municipal owners."
Dividends to the owners of an enterprise can only come from profits
generated by the enterprise. Therefore, although it may at first blush
appear otherwise, municipal utilities also have an incentive to earn a
profit on their investment in utility plants. 8
It is not uncommon that ordinances creating municipal utilities include
a requirement that the utility generate enough revenue to pass on a certain
amount or percentage to the general fund of the municipality each year.
The result is simply profit by another name. In many instances the same
result comes about without a requirement therefor in an ordinance. When
such utility generated revenue is passed on to a municipality's general
fund, it can be used for all manner of non-utility purposes. It becomes,
in effect, a substitute for taxation and a hidden tax.
When a municipal utility does, whether by ordinance, by design, or
by accident, generate more in utility revenues than its cost of providing
utility service, it is an unlikely circumstance that such excess would be
returned to the municipal utility consumers-it is transferred to the general
fund of the municipality-again, profit by another name. Further, municipal utility rate, line extension and expansion cost policies are more
likely to include cross-subsidizations than are privately owned utilities
108. C. Revell, General Fund Transfers-Are There Limits?, 48 Pub. Power 16 (1990).
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because state utility regulatory laws require that investor owned utility
rates and charges be cost based.
A conclusion that municipal electricity customers will pay lower rates
if a city should develop a municipal electric utility to replace a portion
of an investor owned utility is questionable even by applying common
sense to the circumstance of the separation of a small piece of an operating
utility to be operated as a separate entity. Considering the basic components of the cost of providing electric utility service, it is reasonable
to conclude that it would be very difficult for a new utility formed by
taking over a small portion of a much larger incumbent utility's operation
to achieve any savings. The incumbent utility's system plant costs and
investments are the blended result of plant and operating systems that
were installed in prior years. It is unreasonable to assume that the incumbent would sell those assets for their book value without any incentive
in the form of an appropriate premium over that book value. The ownership related costs of any such new municipal utility acquiring another
utility's system or a portion thereof, then, will be higher than the same
costs for the incumbent utility. The same would apply if the new utility
chose to build its own new distribution system rather than acquire facilities
from the incumbent utility. The new facilities, which would -be entirely
funded by debt, would cost more than the blended historical book value
of the incumbent utility's facilities that are being replaced, and that would
be compounded by the debt service thereon.
With respect to operating costs, consideration of economies of scale
also make it unlikely that a new utility taking over a portion of an
incumbent utility's system will be able to operate the acquired smaller
portion of the system at a lower cost. There will unavoidably be some
duplicative basic managerial, supervisory, administrative, physical infrastructure, and operating costs associated with the operation of the new
smaller utility. That being the case, it is likely that the new utility's
system operating costs would be higher than the incumbent's.
In such a case, the greatest potential for savings to the customers of
the new smaller utility must. arise from lower system input power costs.
However, even if lower input power costs could be achieved, that lowering
of cost must be of sufficient magnitude to overcome any increases in cost
potentially incurred for the ownership and operation of the basic distribution system, transmission facilities and interconnections, and other
physical infrastructure and administrative operations. Therefore, even a
lowered input power cost cannot, alone and without significant further
economies, assure lower rates to a new utility taking over a portion of
an incumbent utility's system.
The same applies whether the new smaller utility's input power costs
arise from the purchase of wholesale power or if the new utility chooses

Sprngl1921

CURRENT UTILITY REGULATION

to install its own generating facilities. In the case of new generating
facilities, the cost of the achievement of adequate interconnection facilities
for the market sale of surplus generated power and the cost of providing
for back-up and emergency power supplies for purposes of reliability
must be accounted for. Regarding the potential for development of "QF"
status cogeneration facilities under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy
Act of 1978 (PURPA), the costs associated with the possible need to
develop a thermal host facility must be considered and factored into both
the direct utility and overall project cost.
Another argument frequently heard in favor of municipal utilities is
that a local city council can do a better and more responsive job for its
citizens than can a state level utility regulatory commission. The supporting concept is generally expressed by the claim a municipal utility is
self-regulated by its city council. Exploration of that notion, however,
generates significant questions.
Again, it must be remembered that some of the principal reasons for
the establishment of the institution of state utility regulatory commissions
shortly after the turn of this century involved problems with municipal
regulation of utilities. One of those reasons was that there was usually
inadequate expertise in complex utility financial matters available within
municipal governments' The United States Supreme Court decision in
Smyth v. Ames in 1898 stated that the determination of proper compensation for utilities ". . . could be more easily determined by a Commission composed of persons whose special skill, operation and experience
qualifies them to handle so great problems. . .. "' The NMPSC deals
with utility problems every day and it is reasonable to assume that the
Commissioners and staff will, in the main and over the long haul of time,
be better prepared to make fair and reasonable decisions on utility related
matters than will any city council who only deals with such matters
occasionally.
Another comparison between municipal utilities controlled only by the
city council and state regulated investor owned utilities has to do with
the potential for the shifting of risk in the case of imprudent management.
There is no reason to assume, to begin with, that lesser experienced
municipal officials can do a better job of either managing or regulating
a utility operation than can, respectively, professional investor owned
utility managers or state public utility regulators. But, assuming the instance of an imprudent action in the management of a utility, the potential
for the shifting of risk for such imprudence away from the ratepayers is
significantly different in the case of a municipal utility.
109. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
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In the case of a state regulated investor owned utility, there is the
potential that the state regulator will shift at least some of the risk of
imprudent management from the ratepayer to the shareholders in an investor owned utility. In the case of a municipal utility, on the other hand,
there are no shareholders, investors, or anyone else to shift such risk tothe municipal ratepayers are stuck with it. Municipal utility ratepayers
may be able to vote imprudent decisionmakers out -of office, but even
that does not provide them any relief as regards the fact that the risk of
imprudent management cannot be transferred away-the municipal ratepayers will still be saddled in their utility bills with the effect of any
imprudent management by a municipal utility.
It is interesting to note that municipal franchise problems are not entirely a new consideration in utility regulation. In 1905 the National Civic
Federation, an organization of business and labor leaders and independent
reformers, published papers indicating that it was desirable to have the
locus of utility regulatory power shifted from the local municipal level
to the state level because local officials, using franchise powers, could
"blackmail" the utilities into accepting unjust terms. Another reason
given was the need to reduce the intrusion of party politics into utility
regulation..o
This situation of varying benefit and disbenefit among the affected
parties relates to the regulatory compact, for which the state regulatory
commission, not the city government, is the responsible administrator.
The state commission is statutorily charged with looking out for the
interest of all of the customers of the utilities they regulate and also for
the general public interest and for the interest of the investors in the utility
as well. The ultimate questions associated with municipalization must,
then, be answered at the state, not the municipal level, which is something
history has already taught us in any case. Can a commission allow the
customers of a city to obtain benefits at the expense of all of the other
customers of the utility and of the investors in the utility as well? Whereas
such an outcome might not be counter to classical economic theory, it is
counter to a significant component of the public interest justification for
the regulation of utilities.
10. Affiliate Transactions
Another problematic trend in regulatory practice has to do with situ-

ations where a utility is involved in transactions with affiliated businesses
or individuals. There is a trend among regulators to, in effect, consider
unregulated affiliates of utilities to be one and the same business entity
110.

Jones, supra note 53, at 453.
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with the utility and, as a result, to apply regulatory principles of economic
regulation to the services, products, labor, equipment, et cetera of the
unregulated affiliates. This is an example of regulators extending their
market substitution function and duty beyond the market for the utility
commodity within the utility's certified territory.
The regulatory determination should be whether or not the utility management decision to purchase whatever it might have purchased from the
affiliate was made in good faith and with the use of prudent wisdom and
judgment at the time when the decision was made. The determination,
then, is similar to the concepts previously expressed with regard to load
forecasts in the section on excess capacity and with respect to regulatory
disallowance of utility costs and expenses. If it cannot be proven that the
decision to purchase something from an affiliate was imprudent and an
abuse of discretion by the utility-if it cannot be shown that the price
paid was not reasonable as regards the market for the particular commodity-a commission cannot then employ its current judgment as a
substitute for the prior judgment of the utility's management.
It is certainly tempting to simply extend regulatory jurisdiction to the
unregulated affiliates of utilities-it would appear to be simpler and easier
to administer. But caution must be exercised to avoid the proliferation
of unnecessary regulation and government interference into markets that
are already competitive and require no additional government interference
to protect the public interest. This goes back to the notion that history
never did tell us that the regulation of utilities was supposed to be easy.
The regulator must, under the regulatory compact, employ its impartial
and knowledgeable judgment, however difficult, and, assuming that the
record in the case provides adequate substantial evidence, determine if
all or certain portions of such costs and expenses should be disallowed
for the purposes of setting fair, just, and reasonable rates.
The process described is, and must be, the same as that previously
described in the section on disallowance-and no more. To do otherwise
would be an interference by the government regulator into an unregulated
market to the unfair disadvantage of the utility affiliate. Further, to do
otherwise could result in confiscation of the affiliate's property. Utilities
have no special rights to the property and commodities belonging to their
unregulated affiliates or to their owners.
There may be found in actual practice circumstances where no identifiable competitive market exists with respect to a particular utility transaction. In such an instance the regulators must do everything within their
power to maintain the critical policy of non-interference with unregulated
competitive markets. Their decision in such an instance must unavoidably
be based on their just and reasonable judgment. But, since regulatory
orders are an integral part of the process of providing signals to those
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they regulate, the order in such a case should clearly indicate that the
decision was purely judgmental because no applicable competitive market
could be identified and the order should re-state the policy of non-interference with transactions within existing competitive markets.
11. Integrated Resource Planning
Integrated resource planning (IRP) and least cost planning (LCP), which
is essentially a synonym of IRP, are among the newest of the many utility
regulatory "buzzwords" that came into being over the last few years.
Inextricably associated with IRP and LCP are demand side management
(DSM) and supply side management (SSM). IRP and LCP in plain English
simply mean that utility managers ought to plan in the most effective
manner so as to maximize the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of utility
operations. It amounts to placing a label on common sense--one should
certainly not expect managers of any business, utility or otherwise, to
operate in any other manner. Clearly, then, the intent and purpose of IRP
and LCP are within the prerogative of the management as to how those
goals and objectives are to be achieved.
Currently, however, many state regulatory agencies around the country
either have or are considering the development of rules and regulations
frequently requiring that utilities in some manner prepare, file for regulatory approval, and thereafter comply with IRP, LCP, DSM and SSM
plans. The likely result of such regulatory action is pre-approval of utility
management actions which will result in self-capture by the regulatory
agency. Once a regulatory agency gives its imprimatur to a utility management action or plan for action before the fact, the regulator is captured
with respect to that action because, if a utility carefully complies with
the management plan approved by the regulator, the regulator cannot,
should the plan not perform as expected, make a case in an ensuing rate
proceeding that the utility management was imprudent. The utility will
have done as it was told or ordered by the regulatory agency.
A related buzzword in current use in regulatory practice associated
with IRP, and many other regulatory activities as well, is the expression
of the need for regulators to be "proactive." It is most productive for
regulators to be proactive in the sense of causing themselves to be well
informed and "on top" of matters that are and will be issues in cases
that will come before them. However, regulatory pro-activity can be
counterproductive if it extends to not only becoming well-informed but
also includes the regulatory agency in any way participating in the process
of utility management before the fact of utility management action.
The existing regulatory process already includes all of the elements
needed to achieve the goals of IRP and LCP. The well-established regulatory process of assessing the prudence (which is not synonymous with

Spring 1992]

CURRENT UTILITY REGULATION

optimization) of utility management action in a fair and reasonable manner
in rate proceedings can achieve those goals in the manner most appropriate
and prudent for the regulator. The problem that regulators are trying to
deal with by being pro-active in IRP and LCP stems from the issues that
have arisen from regulatory prudence actions taken, in particular, in the
case of nuclear generating plant development. It is felt by many that if
the regulators would have somehow participated in nuclear plant decisions, they could have avoided the need to make decisions after the fact
as to the prudence of the decisions. However, as previously discussed,
the problems with nuclear plant prudence decisions were not necessarily
caused by the traditional regulatory process itself, but rather by the manner
in which it was employed.
Further, there is not and was not any reason to assume or conclude
that regulators would be in a position to assure better decisionmaking
than are the utility managers. The only source of information for the
regulators and the utility managers (or anyone else for that matter) upon
which to make a before-the-fact decision is the utility industry. There is
no reason to assume that regulators will make better utility management
decisions than will the utility managers themselves. Further, as previously
stated, once a regulator has either made or participated in a utility management decision, the result is self-capture by the agency causing the
regulator's hands to be tied when the time comes to make an after-thefact decision as to the prudency of the decision. Some have proposed a
process or sequenced or "rolling" regulatory approvals and prudence
reviews, but the same self-capture will occur at any point in time that a
regulator might take such an action where they have in any manner
formally blessed a utility management action before-the-fact. The only
difference is that the self-capture would occur in smaller increments.
The nature of the judgments required of utility regulators in today's
world are extremely complex and difficult. Regulatory rules and regulations that result in direct governance of utility actions are not the answer.
Fairness and reasonableness in regulatory decisionmaking based on complete and well considered information within the traditional regulatory
process still remains the best solution. That is why, going all the way
back to the Smyth v. Ames case which was decided in 1898, the Supreme
Court said that such difficult matters involving utilities ". . . could be
more easily determined by a Commission composed of persons whose
special skill, operation and experience qualifies them to handle so great
problems. .... ".'
Things really haven't changed in that regard for nearly a century nor
are they likely to change in the foreseeable future. As former General
ii1. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
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Counsel for the New York Public Service Commission Kent H. Brown
wrote in 1955 with respect to the operation of the provisions of public
service law; "The fundamental standards-justness and reasonablenessare as appropriate today as they were fifty years ago."-and I believe
they are still appropriate today."' Those common sense standards must
be applied by common sense regulators who are fully informed and able
to sort out the factual circumstances, theoretical economic principles,
technical matters, and, most importantly, the public interest aspects of
the issues before them, all in the perspective of our history and the
regulatory compact.
All of the areas of current regulatory practice discussed are examples
of where there has been or there is under consideration movement away
from traditional regulation under the regulatory compact.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
If the regulatory trends discussed herein continue unchecked, we may
not have available in the future the same level of safe, adequate, reliable,
and reasonably priced utility service that has so far provided so much
necessary support for the growth and health of our total economy and
our personal standard of living.
The basic thrust of current regulatory reform is to replace regulation
to the very greatest extent possible with competition. However, the intended purpose, function and method of our regulatory process seems to
be imperfectly understood by some of the current reformers. For instance,
it is frequently claimed that regulators are two-faced because they both
regulate and protect the utilities. This conclusion is easily reached, but
it is logically inadequate and incomplete.
kegulation by government necessarily requires the taking away of rights
from the utility business being regulated which then requires concomitant
obligations by the government. Therefore, regulation and protection are
inextricably linked. To do otherwise would be blatantly unfair. Further,
the abrogation of the regulatory compact which provides for the protection
by its husbandmen, the regulators, is frequently claimed as the underlying
reason for the criticism of regulation. Such criticism, then, is an example
of illogical and circular reasoning. In fact, the imperfection of regulation
during, in particular, the last two decades is the primary justification
expressed for deregulating or partially deregulating the utility industry.
It is further argued that utilities are less monopolistic than they were and
that they are certainly no longer a natural monopoly. In fact, what is
being concluded is that utilities are not perfect monopolies and certainly
112. Priest, supra note 51, at 31.
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not perfect natural monopolies. That is another easy conclusion to reachutilities have never been perfect in any regard including their monopoly
nature-but they are still and in the foreseeable future they still will be
monopolistic and history tells us that even after deregulation they will
most likely return toward a monopolistic structure-which will also most
likely be imperfect. Any justification assuming failure based upon the
expectation of perfection is a self-fulfilling prophecy, but common sense
says it is also probably wrong.
However, the proposed deregulation does not mean that there will no
longer be economic regulation by government, even of the deregulated
utility industries or portions thereof. Government will always have to be
the establisher of guidelines for such induced competition and, as well,
will undoubtedly have to intervene directly in order to assure the maintenance of workable competitive forces.
A longtime criticism of utility regulation in the United States is the
matter of capture of the regulators by the industry. Capture is thought to
occur when there is undue influence exerted by the regulated industry on
the government regulators. Such undue influence can occur as a result
of either the intentional or unintentional co-option of the regulators by
the regulated. It can also result from industry control of the data and
information provided by the industry to its regulators.
The ultimate effect of capture, whatever the reasons therefor, is a
convergence of the interest of the industry with the interest that is the
intended responsibility of the regulator-the public interest. That convergence is not necessarily a bad thing. It is possible that the two interests
could truly converge and everyone would benefit as a result. Of course,
the opposite can occur should there be improper convergence. But whatever the case, concerns regarding capture cannot be a. true justification
for any of the proposed schemes of deregulation because government
intervention, and therefore the potential for capture, will exist both before
and after deregulation.
Current actions moving toward partial and possibly complete deregulation are based primarily on the classical economic theory of competition
and the associated premise that the public interest will be as well or better
served by replacing government regulation of utilities by the government
arranging instead for what is hoped to be self-regulating competition. A
major problem stems from the need to use the word "arranging." Such
government arranged competition cannot be Adam Smith's "invisible
hand" of competition. It can better be described as some sort of robotic
device invented, and probably frequently reinvented, by the government.
It would seem reasonable, then, to question just how perfect or even
workable such government arranged and controlled competition can be.
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The word competition has become the rallying cry of the movement
to deregulate our utilities-and with respect to the grand majority of our
business and industrial economy, well it should. It seems, however, to
go unrecognized, or at least unstated, that the competition being put
forward for utilities is not the classical model of competition where there
is free and easy entry and numerous market participants-i.e., the atomistic competition envisioned by Adam Smith. Mr. Joseph C. Swidler,
former Chairman of the Federal Power Commission and the New York
Public Service Commission, said in a recent article that "Adam Smith
himself, if he were with us today, would be puzzled by the concept of
applying open market doctrine to electric utilities.""'3 Also, with respect
to our utilities, how can we know, especially considering the history of
our utilities, that any competition that may result will be of a positive
nature?
Finally, and most importantly, the elemental reason for regulation of
any business by government, utility or otherwise, is the public interest,
and it has been so since the time of Lord Chief Justice Hale over 300
years ago. Boiled down to reality, economic theory, including that of
self-regulating competition, is just one mechanism by which the protection
of the public interest is sometimes achieved. It cannot be the end-all and
be-all of the formation of public policy in this most critical area. The
regulatory compact under which our utilities have operated never could
be and never will be able to be reduced to a quasi-scientific system of
plug-in formulas or theories that do not require frequently very difficult
and controversial informed judgment by the makers and implementers of
public policy.
This reasoning brings us again to the conclusion that the current choice
for our utilities is truly between imperfect regulation and imperfect competition. Basic logic, however, tells that whereas the justifications for
utility deregulation being generally put forth may be necessary elements
of analysis, they have not been shown to be sufficient to support the
conclusion.
The utility industry affects each of us every day of our lives including
both our home lives and our working lives. If we are going to change
the structure of the utility industry, through deregulation or whatever, we
must have reasons both clearly necessary and sufficient to do so. Current
regulatory trends appear to be a combination of risky cut-and-try experimentation and a repeat of the failed policies of the not so distant past.
Further, there seems to be little consideration given to a workable path
for retreat if the experiments fail.
113, J. Swidler, An Unthinkably Horrible Situation, 128 Pub. Utils. Fort. 14 (1991).
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The policymakers in the regulatory community, the state legislatures,
the Congress and the courts, as well as those in the utility industry, must
always consider changes in the utility regulatory process in the light of
our history. Most critically, all such changes must recognize the regulatory
compact which is the ultimate expression and result of the history and
development of our unique utility regulatory system. It should be remembered that history is not a dead issue-it tends to repeat itself.

